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Abstract 
In a post-apartheid South Africa, the electricity supply industry (ESI) will be 
under pressure to make up the backlog in electricity provision to poor 
households. Simultaneously, it will have to protect its financial viability in 
order to maintain a low-cost electricity supply to support a growing economy. 
This study analyses the current structure and governance of the ESI and 
proposes a significant restructuring to enable these challenges to be met. 
It is argued that the highly fragmented distribution sector of the ESI should 
be rationalised, and that the industry should re1Ttain in the public sector. 
Questions around the governance and regulation of the ESI are identified as 
critical to the future performance of the industry. By drawing on international 
experience, a distinction is made between the roles of politics and technical 
expertise in the governance of the ESL On the basis of this distinction, a new 
governance model is developed, which is based on a contract-plan mechanism, 
but which relies on the role of stakeholders and an independent regulator. In 
this way, this thesis attempts to establish in the governance system an 
appropriate balance between the equity concerns of a new democratic 
government, and the efficiency needs of a developing economy. 
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
South Africa is undergoing fundamental political and constitutional change 
that will, for the first time, bring democracy to this country. After years of 
apartheid discrimination, a democratic government will be faced with massive 
demand for the delivery of social services. The electrification of homes will 
feature high on the list of national priorities. 
The national social infrastructure, including the electricity supply industry, has 
developed, under decades of apartheid rule, to serve the interests of the white 
minority. Even the very basic needs of the poor, such as the provision of 
adequate shelter, clean water, sanitation and energy, have not been fully met. 
Most South Africans do not have access to domestic electricity and it is 
uncertain whether the electricity supply industry (ESI) will be able to fulfil the 
need for rapid electrification, in its current fragmented form. This thesis 
analyses the problems associated with the present ESI and develops a proposal 
for the restructuring of this industry. 
Internationally, both developed and developing colintries are wrestling with 
three sets of long-term development objectives: 
a) to promote the growth and international competitiveness of their 
economies; 
b) to provide social equity for all the members of their societies; and 
c) to ensure the sustainability of their interactions with the natural 
environment. 
These objectives will have to guide the endeavours of the South African 
. economy as a whole and the electricity supply industry specifically. They will 
present significant challenges for the ESI: 
a) to supply electricity of an appropriate quality and with tariffs that 
promote economic efficiency; 
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Chapter One: Introduction 2 
b) to provide access for the poor and fulfil their.basic energy needs; and' 
c) to protect the environment for future generations. 
Problems with the performance of the power sector in developed and 
developing countries in recent years, have prompted new debates about the 
appropriate organisation of the industry. In developed countries, the scope 
for efficiency improvements through technological developments has become 
limited. The focus has shifted to the potential for changes in the governance 
structure to achieve further improvements in industry performance. Managers 
are now being provided with performance incentives through new forms of 
regulation and the introduction of competition into the power sector. 
In less developed countries a direct "command and control" type of 
governance resulted in prices that were too low, and in a drastic weakening 
of the financial position of utilities. As a result utilities were often not able to 
raise capital to expand their capacity to supply a growing demand for 
electricity. In the worst cases, utilities were not able to obtain foreign currency 
to obtain spare parts for basic maintenance. Problems with poor quality of 
supply, brown-outs and black-outs are widespread in developing countries. 
Multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank, and research organisations, 
such as the Cooperative Programme for Energy and Development (COPED), 
are involved in ongoing research and debate to develop policies for the reform 
of the power sector in developing countries. 
South Africa has unique opportunities in the electricity sector to supply low-
cost electricity to a growing economy, and to provide access to electricity for 
most of its population: it has large surplus generating capacity on the national 
grid and generates the second cheapest electricity in the world; it has the skills 
. . . ' 
and systems to implement a large electrification programme; and most of its 
citizens earn on average higher.incomes than in most other African countries, 
and live in dense settlements that will be relatively cheap to electrify. 
Provided that institutional problems in the electricity distribution industry can 
be solved, these circumstances provide an unique opportunity for low-cost 
household energy supply. Policies for the restructuring of the ESI should be 
aimed at enabling the industry to implement a national electrification 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
programme while simultaneously maintaining a low cost electricity supply to 
an economy that could experience considerabie gro~th in the next decade. In 
the context of a newly established populist democracy, policy proposals 
should specifically aim to avoid the problems experienced by the ESis of other 
developing countries, by establishing a system of governance that will ensure 
the viable management of the ESI through the careful balancing of the 
objectives of public policy with the imperatives of a viable industry. 
The scope of the research was initially limited to the electricity distribution 
industry. But, the quest for equity in service delivery and efficiency 
improvements in power system operations and expansion is directly 
influenced by the interrelated nature of modem interconnected power systems. 
The investigation was thus extended to the electricity supply industry in its 
entirety, while maintaining a focus on the distribution of electricity. Both the 
structure and the governance of the ESI are discussed, but emphasis is placed 
on issues related to governance. Questions affecting the relationship between 
the state and the ESI, such as policy formulation, regulation, utility 
supervision and ownership, thus receive particular attention. 
Chapter Two discusses the problems of the present ESI and briefly reviews the 
industry's historical development. In Chapter Three, relevant international 
experience is drawn on to develop a theoretical framework that enables the 
formulation of guidelines for the structuring of a future ESL The fourth 
chapter builds on these guidelines in order to develop a specific proposal for 
the future structure and governance of the ESL In the last chapter 
considerations for managing the transition of the ESI are discussed. 
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Chapter Two 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY 
2.1 Introduction 
The current organisation of the South African electricity supply industry (ESI) 
and the pattern of unequal domestic access to electricity is the result of ~ 
historic process that is closely tied up with the development of the South 
. . 1 
African economy and the apartheid state. 
This chapter provides a background to the debate on the restructuring of the 
ESL It starts out with a brief discussion of the historical development of the 
ESI, followed by a description of present electricity supply patterns and a 
review of the industry's structure and gov'emance. The section that follows 
discusses the nature and scale of a proposed national electrification 
programme. In conclusion, the need for restructuring, and the initiatives 
currently being underta.ken to achieve this, are discussed. 
2.2 A history of the development of the electricity supply 
industry 
A review of the historical development of the ESI enables a clearer 
understanding of the problems currently associated with the industry. 
Municipalities took the lead in supplyi!lg electricity in South Africa. Shortly 
after the discovery of diamonds in Kim~erley, the first electric street lights 
were switched on in this growing mining town in ~882. Kimberley 
municipality established its own reticulation service in 1890, Johannesburg in 
1891, Pretoria in 1892, Cape Town in 1895, Durban in 1897, East London in 
1899 and Bloemfontein in 1900 (de Villiers 1984). The discqvery of gold on the 
Witwatersrand in 1886, and the subsequent development of the mining 
industry, required_ the generation of electricity- on ,a more extensive scale. 
After the Anglo-Boer War (1899-190Z), the demand for electricity by the 
mining se~tor rose sharply. Mining compan'ies established 'a number of 
independent power stati<~ns _in Ki!Ilberley and on· the, Witwatersrand.- The 
largest was the Victoria ~alls Power Compa~y which was registered in 
October 1906. In 1909 it changed its name to ~e Victoria Falls and Transvaal 
l 
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Chapter Two: The South African Electricity Supply Industry 5 
Power Company (VFTPC) (Horwitz 1993). 
The development of the ESI can be split into four 'distinct periods (Horwitz 
1993). From 1906 to 1922, the industry consisted of a mixture of private and 
municipal enterprises. After 1922, a national public body, the Electricity 
Supply Commission (Escom), co-operated with the private and municipal 
suppliers. After 1948 Escom took over the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power 
Company, thereby essentially monopolising the generation and transmission 
of electricity. In 1985, Escom underwent a major restructuring after a period 
of poor performance. 
Early legislation dealing with electricity supply focused on minimum safety 
standards (Morgan 1993a). The earliest law dealing with electricity supply 
was probably the Municipal Corporations Lighting Law, Natal, No. 22 of 1891 
(Morgan 1993a). Shortly after the Anglo-Boer War, legislation was enacted in 
the Transvaal, Cape Colony and the Orange Free State that subjected tl~e 
supply of electricity to the consent of local authorities and the colonial 
administrator. This principle of local government and provincial level 
(previously colonial) control has survived up until the present time. 
In 1909, the Power Companies Commission, set up to "enquire into the 
desirability of the establishment of large electric power companies in the 
Transvaal", reported that the supply of electric power should as far as possible 
be left to private enterprise. However, noting that "the supply of electricity 
leads to a virtual monopoly in [the supply of] a commodity which has become 
practically a necessity of modern civilisation", the commission recommended 
that electricity supply should be placed under government control to ensure 
the equitable supply of power, public safety and the public interest in general 
(Morgan 1993a). 
In 1910 the Transvaal Colonial Government passed the Power Act of 1910 to 
effect the recommendations of the Power Companies Commission. The Act 
stipulated that an electricity undertaking could only be established under a 
licence issued by the Minister of Mines. It established a Power Undertakings 
Board, consisting of public officials, that acted in an advisory capacity to the 
Minister. Municipalities were not required to have a licence and were thus 
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Chapter Two: The South African Electricity Supply Industry 6 
I 
' . 
not controlled by the Board and the Minister. Undertakings applying for a 
licence had to submit a schedule of standard prices together with th~ . 
application. The Minister was obliged to refer a licence application to the 
Board, which held public hearings on the application before advising the 
Minister on whether the application should be granted or refused. Members 
of the public were thus given the opportunity to object to the licence 
I ; 
application. The Act also specified that companies had to pay all consumers 
twenty five per cent of their "surplus profits" at a rate pro rata to thefr 
electricity consumption. This principle remained . the accepted manner of 
regulating licensed power companies in the Union of South Africa until the 
passing of the Electricity Act of 1922 (Horwitz 1993). 
The South African Railways and Harbours Administration (SAR&H) played 
an important role in the development of the ESI as a result of their need to 
electrify the railways. The SAR&H commissioned a London firm of consulting 
engineers, Merz and Mclellan, "to study the general question of electric power 
supply" (Morgan 1993a). Their report, entitled "Electric Power Supply in the 
Union of South Africa" was presented in April 1920. This report reflected 
concern about the uncoordinated development of the ESI, which could 
potentially impose a high cost on future industrial development. It led to the 
promulgation of the Electricity Act No 42 of 1922 by the Government of the 
Union, which established the Electricity Supply Commission (Escom) and the 
Electricity Control Board (ECB). Escom's primary mandate was to establish 
new electricity undertakings and to co-operate with existing undertakings so 
as to ensure a cheap and abundant supply of electricity. Escom was supposed 
to supply electricity "neither at a profit nor at a loss". The Electricity Control 
Board was established to control the supply of electricity by the Commission 
and private undertakings. The Act stipulated that the supply of electricity 
could not be undertaken without a licence issued by the Board. Escom and 
private undertakings were thus obliged to apply for licences, but local 
authorities and government departments (including the SAR&H) were once 
again exempted. The Act also included the profit sharing stipulations 
introduced by the Transvaal Power Act of 1910. 
Escom grew- steadily as the bulk supplier of electricity. In 1948 Escom 
purchased the VFTPC after complaints from the mines about excessive profit-
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Chapter Two: The South African Electricity Supply Industry 7 
taking, despite the "automatic" profit rebate system (Horwitz 1993). By finally 
taking over the VFTPC, Escom established itself as a national public monopoly 
i 
electricity generator. The take-over coincided with the rise of Afrikaner 
\ 
Nationalism and the election of a Nationalist government. 
In 1957 the Electrieity Act was translated into Afrikaans and incorporated with 
all its amendments into a new Act, the Electricity Act No. 40 of 1958. In 1971 
the Electricity Amendment Act, No. 49 of 1971, was passed to allow for the 
establishment of a Capital Development Fund. This Act also allowed the 
different regional undertakings to be connected to allow the Escom power 
stations to be run as an integrated system. By 1973, all the separate Escom 
undertakings were linked by the national grid. 
Up until the mid 1970s, Escom progressed successfully as the central electricity 
supply organisation. It enjoyed the benefits of improving technology and 
continued demand growth. Towards the end of the 1970s, inflation, higher 
financing costs and the reduced financial returns of new technology 
contributed to poor performance and high tariff increases (De Villiers 1984). 
These problems, together with the high proportion of South African foreign 
debt that was attributable to Escom, prompted the State President to appoint 
the "Commission of Inquiry into the Supply of Electricity in the Republic of 
South Africa" (1984) under the chairmanship of Dr W J de Villiers. De Villiers 
---recommended that a two-tier control structure be introduced, consisting of ~ 
board of control and a management board, and that the principle -of operating ll 
neither at a profit nor a loss be discarded in favour of a sound assets and 
income structure. It was also proposed that the concept of different 
undertakings within Escom be discarded and allowance made for the pooling 
of costs. This meant that the tariffs for different consumer classes could be 
built up from national mean pooled costs. 
These recommendations should be read in the context of the government's 
interest in privatising Escom and other parastatals at that time (Horwitz 1993). 
Many of the De Villiers recommendations were given effect to in 1985 when 
the Electricity Act of 1958 was amended. The amendment restructured the 
Electricity Supply Commission by establishing the Electricity Council whose 
tasks were to determine policy for Escom and appoint and oversee the 
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Chapter Two: The South African Electricity Supply Industry 8 
management board. The Electricity Council was to consist of stakeholders and 
independent experts and was supposed to operate in the manner of a board 
of directors for a company in the private sector. 
The Electricity Act of 1958 was repealed by the Electricity Act of 1987. The 
new Act provided for the continued existence of the Electricity Control Board. 
It also exempted Local Authorities (when supplying within their area of 
jurisdiction), self-governing territories and Eskom from requiring a licence to 
supply electricity. The Eskom Act of 1987 consoliclated all the amendments 
to the Electricity Act with regard to Escom, and ch'anged the spelling of the 
name to Eskom. 
De Villiers improved the management of Eskom and ensured that the interests 
of industry, commerce and white municipalities were represented on the 
Electricity Council. The commission did nothing to change the lot of black 
households, most of whom were still without any electricity connection. 
In metropolitan areas, white local authorities traditionally supplied some 
adjacent black townships with electricity. In 1973, however, Bantu 
Administration Boards were established to take over the supply of services to 
the black townships. These Boards did not have access to the revenue base 
of the wealthier white local authorities, which incorporated local industry and 
commerce. The immediate consequence was a decline in the standard of 
service to black townships, and an inability to extend services. In the early 
1980s, with the passing of the Black Local Authorities Act (No 102 of 1982), 
service provision was taken over by the black local authorities. This change 
precipitated the current crises in service provision (including electricity) to 
black areas. 
2.3 Domestic electricity supply 
South Africa has a total net generating capacity of about 37 000 MW and in 
1992 produced 149 427 GWh of electricity (Eskom 1993a). The percentage of 
electricity use per sector during 1990/91 is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
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Other (7.4%) 
Traction (2.7%) 
Mining (23.1 %) 
Figure 2.1 : Electricity use in South Africa 
Source: Compiled from Eskom {1993b) 
9 
Business (5.5%) 
Figure 2.1 shows that mining and industry consume just under 70 per cent of 
the electricity produced in South Africa, while the domestic sector consumes 
only 16 per cent. Total annual domestic electricity consumption is in the 
region of 23 310 GWh. 
Table 2.1: Household access to electricity in 1993 
Source: NELF Database (1993) 
Dwellings Number in Percentage 
category electrified 
RURAL 3 500 000 6% 
Farm workers 900 000 15% 
Dense settlements 1 300 000 4% 
Scattered settlements 1 300 000 1% 
URBAN 5 300 000 54% 
Informal unplanned 500 000 0% 
Informal planned 600 000 12% 
Backyard shacks 700 000 17% 
Formal low income 1 400 000 41% 
Formal mid-high income 2 100 000 100% 
TOTAL 8 800 000 35% 
Table 2.1 shows the proportion of rural and urban households which have 
access to electricity. 
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Chapter Two: The South African Electricity Supply Industry 10 
Only about 35 per cent of households have access to electricity in South 
Africa. Most of these are in the urban areas where approximately 54 per cent 
of households are electrified. In the rural areas, which hold 40 per cent of 
South Africa's population, only six per cent of households have access to 
electricity. ln total, between 65 per cent and 70 per cent of all South Africans 
live without a household electricity supply. 
The low levels of household electricity supply, slow progress with 
electrification and other problems related to the supply of electricity, such as 
the more than 1100 different domestic tariffs that are applied (AMEU 1993), 
are closely related to the institutional fragmentation of the electricity 
distribution industry (EDI). These problems are discussed in more detail 
below. 
2.4 The present electricity supply industry 
The operating structure of the ESI can be divided along functional lines into 
three sectors: generation, transmission and distribution. Bodies undertaking 
the generation of electricity from thermal, nuclear and hydro sources form the 
generation sector. The transmissi n sector is made up of the bodies that 
undertake the high-voltage bulk transmission of electricity from the generation 
source to the distribution utilities. Distributors that are responsible for the 
final supply to end users fall into the distribution sector. The operating 
structure of the South African ESI is illustrated in figure 2.2 
z 
0 
~ 
w 
z 
w 
C) 
Eskom 
Figure 2.2: The present operating structure of the South African ESI 
Source: Steyri & Theron (1992) 
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Chapter Two: The South African Electricity Supply Industry 11 
Eskom supplies 98 per cent of all the electricity generated in South Africa from 
power stations that are mostly situated in the Eastern Transvaal Highveld. 
l 
Some of the larger municipalities, such as Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and 
I 
Johannesburg operate small power stations. Most of the municipal power 
' 
stations are used as a backup to the Eskom system and run only occasionally' 
(except in the case of Johannesburg, which has ready access to very cheap 
' 
coal). Eskom has large surplus generating capacity and provides bulk tariff 
incentives for municipalities not to operate their own stations. 
Eskom owns and operates the national integrated transmission network that 
transmits high-voltage bulk electricity to all its large' consumers, including the 
distributors. 
Compared to the effectively organised, and efficiently run generation and 
transmission sectors, the distribution sector is highly fragmented; its operation 
is the source of many problems in the supply of electricity to end consumers. 
The EDI in South Africa comprises of about 430 electricity distributors (DMEA 
1992). Eskom is the single largest distributor and white local authorities make 
up the bulk of the distributors. There are a host of smaller distributors as 
well, mostly black local authorities and homeland electricity supply 
corporations, homeland Departments of Works and homeland municipalities. 
A few Regional Services Councils and joint venture companies OVCs), 
established by Eskom, also supply electricity to end users. 
Table 2.2 shows that the largest six distributors serve nearly half of the total 
number of consumers. About 351 (90 per cent) of the remaining distributors 
have less than 10 000 consumers and 209 have less than 1000 consumers 
(DMEA 1992: 21). 
The present fragmentation of the electricity distribution industry (EDI) can be 
explained by its fragmented governance, and specifically by the role that local 
government has played historically in the supply of electricity. The Eskom 
Act (No. 40 of 1987) and the Electricity Act (No 41of1987) are the two central 
statutes that govern electricity supply in South Africa at present. The 
Electricity Act requires distributors to operate under a licence issued by the 
Electricity Control Board. But the Act exempts both local authorities 
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Chapter Two: The South African Electricity Supply Industry 
Table 2.2: End consumers of the six largest electricity distributors 
Source: Adapted from DMEA (1992) and Eskom (1993) 
Distributor Domestic Farming Commercial Industrial 
Eskom 397 588 122 112 17 925 2 652 
Durban 258 000 - 30 000 550 
Cape Town 223 000 - 16 300 500 
Pretoria 132 000 4 400 : 446 -
Johannesburg 122 000 - 7 600 4 400 
Port 
Elizabeth 64 000 - 6 200 640 
Subtotal 1 196 588 122 112 82 425 9188 
Others 1 182 000 7 000 93 550 15 300 
TOTAL 2 378 588 129 112 175 975 24 488 
12 
Other Total 
1 602 541 879 
- 288 ~50 
127 239 927 
5 300 142 146 
- 134 000 
1 70 841 
7 030 1417 343 
42 500 1 358 000 
49 530 2 775 343 
supplying in their areas of jurisdiction and Eskom from the licensing 
requirement. Local authority councils thus have first right of supply in their 
areas of jurisdiction, and have full control over most policy matters (including 
tariffs) in their areas. In terms of the Eskom Act, Eskom is authorised to 
generate and supply electricity in South Africa subject to the rights of local 
authorities and licence holders. Although the Electricity Council determines 
Eskom's tariff levels, the Electricity Control Board has final jurisdiction over 
Eskom's tariff structures. 
The fragmentation of the EDI has been exacerbated by the racial division of 
local government. Local authorities in established white areas (WLAs) have 
well-staffed and qualified electricity, maintenance and treasury departments. 
They have well-established electricity networks and large capital development 
funds, together with few demands for new connections. WLAs have a 
diversified residential, commercial and industrial customer base, with good 
peak and base load ratios (load factors) and comfortable profits from 
electricity sales (especially to industrial and commercial consumers), which are 
used to off-set property rates. 
On the other hand, the unpopular local authorities in the poorer black areas 
(BLAs) often do not even have a town electrical engineer. They have 
underdeveloped technical and administrative capacity, together with limited 
access to development capital and a huge demand for new connections. Their 
existing consumer base is generally small, and consists almost exclusively of 
residential customers. This results in poor load factors, and as a consequence, 
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Chapter Two: The South African Electricity Supply Industry 13. 
higher bulk-electricity costs. Their limited revenue from electricity sales is 
exacerbated by service and rent boycotts, leaving them little capacity to 
respond to new demands for electricity at an afforcJ,able cost. 
Local authority municipal departments are under t~e direct political control 
of elected municipal councils. This low-level, racfally-fragmented political 
control has ensured that resources that would enable electrification in the 
poorer black areas, such as surplus revenue and the ability to raise capital, are 
locked into the wealthier white areas that are already fully electrified. 
The financial position of local authority electricity distributors varies widely. 
The larger white local authorities with a significant commercial or industrial 
consumer base are generally in strong financial positions, and traditionally 
generate surpluses in excess of ten per cent of gross revenue. The largest part 
of this surplus is usually transferred to the rates account to provide relief to 
property rates by cross-subsidising "non-tradable" services. Table 2.3 shows 
the surpluses generated by the six largest municipal electricity undertakings. 
White local authorities obtain most o  their income from property rates and 
surpluses on tradeable services, and receive very little support in the form of 
fiscal transfers from first- or second-tier government. Many are thus 
dependent on the surpluse  transferred from the electricity account. In 1992 
a total of Rl.3 billion rands (NELF 1993) was transferred from municipal 
Table 2.3: Surpluses generated by the largest distributors 
Source: Adapted from the NELF Supply Side Database (1993) 
Distributor Financial Balance sheet Actual Actual Surplus as 
year end value (R'OOO) surplus* a percentage of 
(R'OOO) total revenue 
Durban 1992 Rl 295 232 Rll4 662 11,70% 
Johannesburg 1992 R955 389 R215 833 23,07% 
Cape Town 1992 R798 154 R92 571 15,95% 
Pretoria 1993 R494 257 Rl78 766 21,40% 
Port Elizabeth 1993 R316 450 R27 028 11,04% 
Bloemfontein 1992 R269 322 R19 633 15,86% 
*In addition to the sur >lus of income over ex end1ture, the actual surplus includes services p p 
provided free of charge such as public lighting, traffic lights, electricity supply to other 
departments, and the rental of land and buildings for other departments. 
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Chapter Two: The South African Electricity Supply Industry 14 
electricity undertakings to other municipal accounts .. Any restructuring of the 
ESI that will affect the surplus transfers will thus have to coincide with a 
restructuring of national fiscal transfers. 
Municipal distributors probably also conceal large inefficiencies. The 
proliferation of distribution authorities has resulted in a situation where there 
are often more than ten (and sometimes up to twenty) distributors in a 
metropolitan area. Uncoordinated capital expenditure has resulted in the 
costly duplication of electricity networks. There is also often duplication of 
operating and maintenance infrastructure, such as control rooms and 
workshops. In the municipal sector, all co-ordination of research-and-
development and technological standardisation is on a voluntary basis and is 
thus limited. 
..I 
Inefficiencies also result from the system of direct political governance that 
municipal electricity undertakings are subject to. Municipal tariffs are set at 
levels which will generate surpluses. They are not based on long-run 
marginal costs, and often do not even reflect average costs. Pricing signals 
will thus result in inefficient consumer behaviour. The management of local 
government electricity departments generally have a close relationship with 
local government politicians. All major policy decisions (including electricity 
pricing) have to be approved by the elected municipal council. When 
attending industry-related conferences, for instance, management is often 
accompanied by a local government councillor. Thfo direct political command 
and control relationship is bound to result in poor and inefficient management 
practices. The municipal electricity seetor is, for instance, largely oblivious to 
the advances over the last fifteen years in management theory, which aims to 
increase organisation efficiency through measures such as management by 
objectives, performance measurements through performance indicators, 
performance-related human resources management and an emphasis on 
customer-focused marketing activities. 
Generally, the direct command and control governance of municipal electricity 
undertakings prevents a commercial focus, and renders them unattractive to 
professional managers. This results in poor customer care and inefficiencies 
in operation and investment. 
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Chapter Two: The South African Electricity Supply Industry 15 
South Africa's constitutional restructuring wiil result in the amalgamation of 
apartheid-based local government in both urban arid rural areas in terms of 
the Local Government Transitional Bill (B 214-93 (GA)) of 1993. Electricity 
departments, along with other bulk-services departments, will be partly 
rationalised in this process, but restructuring of local government will do 
nothing to improve the governance of electricity. 
2.5 A national electrification programme 
The development of the ESI has been shaped by South Africa's political 
economy. Particular social formations have controlled state power and hence 
the allocation of investment resources. Public enterprises have served the 
needs of industry and those of the enfranchised minority well, while the needs 
of the disenfranchised have largely been neglected. As government is 
democratised, the material interests of a wider range of social formations will 
inevitably be expressed in macro-economic policies which give greater 
emphasis to redistributive investment. Priority will be given to achieving 
greater equity in the provision of basic services, and the EDI will no doubt be 
given a much clearer mandate to extend access to affordable electricity 
supplies. 
A review of the scale of an electrification programme required to supply most 
-households with an electricity connection gives an indication of the demands 
that will be made of the ESI over future years. 
The best available information on the rate of electrification in recent years is 
shown in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: Household electricity connections in South Africa 
Source: Eskom 
1990 1991 
Eskom 31 035 31 000 
Other (mostly municipalities) 43 000 110 843 
Total 
1 
74 035 141 843 
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Chapter Two: The South African Electricity Supply Industry 16 
Although Eskom had attempted to step up their electrification drive in 
previous years, it had only really took on significant proportions by 1992, with 
158 000 new connections. Eskom will not be able to sustain this rate of 
electrification because the municipalities hold the supply rights to most 
residential areas, and Eskom will thus soon run out of areas to connect. 
Recently,significant research effort has been devoted to the appropriate nature 
of a national electrification programme that will supply the majority of South 
African households with electricity. The National Electrification Forum's1 
National Electrification Economic Study (NEES) has drawn on research by 
Eskom and the Energy for Development Research Centre (EDRC) at the 
University of Cape Town, in order to develop scenarios for a national 
electrification programme. A brief review of the most likely scenario for the 
electrification programme will give an indication of the demands that will be 
placed on the ESI over the next twenty years. 
As indicated in Figure 2.3, the rate of connections is projected to rise to 
450 000 per annum in order to keep up with the rate of new household 
formation and to make up the backlog. Such a sustained programme will 
350 000 
300 000 
250 000 
200 000 
150000 
1 00 000 
50 000 
0 
93 95 97 99 1 3 5 7 9 11 
Years (1993 • 2012) 
Figure 2.3: Annual number of connections needed for a national electrification programme 
Source: NEES (1993) 
1Discussed in the next section. 
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Chapter Two: The South African Electricity Supply Industry 17 
achieve 70 per cent household access over a decade and 80 per cent household 
access over twenty years. 
Based on realistic assumptions about the cost of connections, consumption 
growth, operating and maintenance costs and a four per cent real discount 
rate, it is calculated that, with a tariff employing a single energy rate of 
18c/kWh, the programme will have a maximum: cumulative financing 
requirement of R28.0 billion (in 1993 rands) (NEES 1993: 12). Figure 2.4 shows 
the annual and cumulative financing requirements for the programme 
inclusive of both the operating and capital costs. 
0 
-5 000 
-10 000 
Mill ion 
Rands -15 000 
(1993) 
-20 000 
-25 000 
-30 000 
-.. ,,I I E I I I 1 1 I I I I ,. • I 
-
93 95 97 99 1 3 5 7 9 11 
Years (1993 - 2012). 
Im Annual cash flow •Cumulative cash flow I 
Figure 2.4: Total financing requirement for a national electrification programme 
Source: NEES (1993) 
Average annual capital expenditure is Rl.5 billion per annum, and will peak 
at R2 billion around the twelfth year of the programme. The operating cash 
flow turns positive after about 13 years. The operating cash flow for the rural 
part of the programme remains negative throughout the programme, but it 
will be smaller that the operating surpluses that are incurred in urban areas 
towards the latter half of the programme. 
Many options for financing the programme exist. Van Horen (1994) identified 
the significant role that a financing contribution from the existing domestic 
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Chapter Two: The South African Electricity Supply Industry 18 
consumer base can play. If, for example, all domestic tariffs could be 
rationalised to an average level of 18c/kWh, as assumed above, the potential 
additional financing contribution from the existing formal mid-high income 
consumer class will be more than R400 million per year. It is also possible to 
cross-subsidise the electrification programme from other consumer classes by 
redirecting the present surplus transfers back to the ESL In addition, South 
Africa has well-developed financial markets, and the ESI (Eskom in particular) 
raises finance on the open capital market on an ongoing basis. Grant and 
subsidy finance will also remain important sources of funding for 
electrification in the future. 
The institutional structure and governance framework of the ESI will affect the 
extent to which these financing opportunities can be exploited. In the 
following chapters it will be demonstrated that the need to ensure the 
sustainable financing and implementation of a national electrification 
programme will be an important guideline for ESI restructuring. 
2.6 The need for restructuring 
The political changes in South Africa since February 1990 have enabled the 
demands for equity in access to social services to be heard. Access to 
affordable electricity has become a central component of these demands. The 
inability of the local government system to supply an affordable service of 
adequate quality, and to sufficiently increase access, has contributed to the 
conflict between township residents and local authority distributors. As a 
result, electricity supply has been politicised, and in many townships rent and 
service (including electricity) boycotts have been in effect for years. Although 
electricity distribution was not initially intended to be its central objective, 
Eskom has stepped into the gap left by local authorities. However, Eskom can 
only easily gain access to those areas that are rtot controlled by local 
authorities. It requires the consent of the relevant local authority to supply 
electricity within its area of jurisdiction in terms of the Electricity Act. The 
Remuneration of Town Clerks Act (No. 115 of 1984) links the remuneration of 
local authority officials to the grading of the local authority, which is in tum 
linked to the number and level of services provided by the local authority. 
Local authority officials thus have an incentive to resist handing over the 
RESTRUCTURING THE SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
Chapter Two: The South African Electricity Supply Industry 19 
supply of electricity to another body. Eskom's ability to sustain or expand the 
programme is thus necessarily constrained by the current structure of the EDI. 
The reasons, discussed in this chapter, for the need to restructure both the 
governance of the ESI and the way the industry is structurally organised, can 
be summarised as follows. The first, and most urgent, imperative arises from 
the problem that the industry, as it is currently organised, is not geared to 
implement the large scale electrification programme discussed above. 
Unelectrified areas should be made available to capable distributors. 
Distributors should be able to finance new electrification projects (from 
internal cash flows and through access to grant and loan finance), and have 
the capacity to plan and implement projects. Distributors should also be able 
to develop legitimate and sustainable policies for supplying a new (often very 
poor) customer base. This includes appropriate policies on pricing, supply 
capacity and levels, and technological standards. Distributors should also be 
able to restructure their own organisations to manage a rapidly growing 
customer base and have the capacity to exploit the benefits, and avoid the 
pitfalls, of new and developing distribution technologies. 
The second imperative relates to the current structural inefficiencies in the ESL 
Existing structural duplication in high voltage supply lines, and maintenance 
and operating systems (depots, workshops, personnel, etc.) should either be 
eliminated (where possible) or avoided in future projects. 
These institutional constraints have led to calls for the industry to be 
restructured. As early as 1983 the Institute for Municipal Treasurers and 
Accountants "supported the concept of the regional supply of electricity, in a 
memorandum to the United Municipal Executive" (DMEA 1992: i). In October 
1990, the Permanent Finance Liaison Committee (PFLC) of the Department of 
Finance appointed a working group to investigate the possibility of 
distributing electricity on a regional basis (PFSK: 1991). This working group 
produced an interim report that was approved by the PFLC in November 1991 
(Venter 1992). In February 1991, the Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs 
requested the then National Energy Council to 
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Chapter Two: The South African Electricity Supply Industry 20 
... make recommendations on suitable future orientated organisational 
structural models for the electricity distribution industry, including the 
identification of legislation that may be necessary, implementation and 
other considerations ... (DMEA 1992) 
The National Energy Council became the Energy Branch of the Department 
of Mineral and Energy Affairs (DMEA) in April 1992. The work of the PFLC-
working group and the DMEA was closely co-ordinated at the request of the 
South African Cabinet. The results of both these investigations were 
published together in 1992 (DMEA 1992). The report concluded that 
significant efficiency gains could be achieved by rationalising the distribution 
industry and recommended the" ... development of a small number (between 
5 and 15) of regional single service (electricity only) distributors on an 
evolutionary basis", to take over most of the current distribution undertakings 
(DMEA: xi). 
At an African National Congress national meeting on electrification in Cape 
Town in February 1992, a call was made for a widely representative national 
electrification forum to address the need for accelerated electrification and 
industry restructuring (Theron 1992). The National Electrification Forum 
(NELF) was launched on 14 May 1993 at a national electrification conference 
in Johannesburg. The NELF represents all stakeholders in the supply of 
electricity and has a plenary, a management committee, a secretariat and 
working groups. Presently there are working groups on: 
• Regulatory Framework, Structure and Policy; 
• Human Resources; 
• Supply Technology, Standards and RAPS; 
• ESI Data Base; 
• Financing and Tariffs; 
• Facilitation of the Transition Process of the Distribution Industry; and 
• End-Use of Energy and the Environment 
The NELF has become the centre for negotiations concerning the restructuring 
of the ESL The management committee has initially set itself the target of 
reaching consensus on a proposed model for restructuring the industry by the 
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Chapter Two: The South African Electricity Supply Industry 21 
end of November 1993, but by January 1994 they had not yet succeeded in 
their objective. 
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Chapter Three 
GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE 
3.1 Introduction 
Electricity is an essential input to modern social and economic development. 
The success of the electricity supply industry (ESI) depends on how effectively 
electricity provision supports social and economic development objectives, as 
defined and prioritised by government policy. In a post-apartheid era, South 
Africa's public policy is likely to be characterised by the pursuit of 
competitiveness, sustainability and, particularly equity. 
The objective of this chapter is to determine theoretical guidelines for 
restructuring the ESI in order to enable it to achieve the objectives of public 
policy. The sections below will each include a brief overview of the key 
concepts, illustrative local and international experience and the relevant 
debates. In conclusion, guidelines are proposed that will act as the basis for 
detailed policy proposals. 
3.2 Governance 
The overall relationship between government and utilities can be characterised 
as one of "governance", which can be understood as the "cluster of control 
relationships between public authorities and utilities" (McGowan 1991: 5). 
Electricity utilities in all countries, whether publicly or privately owned, are 
subject to significant public governance, because (a) electricity systems are 
considered to be a strategic element in a country's economic infrastruCture; 
and (b) transmission and distribution networks are viewed as natural 
monopolies.1 Governance can take various forms: direct control through · 
government ownership, more formal control through regulation, and the general 
control exercised through legislation pertaining to areas such as safety, 
environmental protection, investment, macroeconomic management and 
monopoly control (anti-trust legislation). Governance expresses the notion 
that, as part of the national political process, governments determine the forms 
1Generation is strictly speaking not a natural monopoly, but the large capital 
requirements and lengthy investment commitments in practice prohibit all but the largest 
players from entry. 
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Chapter Three: Governance and Structure 23 
of ownership and the specific forms of control over the ESI on the basis of 
their social and economic policies and ideological leanings. Government 
controls the ESI primarily in two ways. As the executive of the state, it 
controls publicly-owned enterprises in terms of property rights; and if it 
enjoys the support of the legislature, it controls the ESI (private or public) 
through legislation. Governments often choose to relinquish ownership of the 
ESI while maintaining legislative control and .formalising the regulatory 
mechanism. The ownership and regulation of enterprises are thus always part 
of the wider governance equation, and must be evaluated in this context. 
The present organisation of the ESI, in terms of governance and structure, is 
largely the result of the nature of historic government control over the 
industry. Chapter Two illustrates the case of South Africa in this respect. 
3.2.1 Energy policy, supervision and utility management 
The separation of energy policy formulation and utility management 
Internationally, there is growing dissatisfaction with opaque command-and-
control governance of state-owned industries, where national 
energy I economic policy formulation is conflated with enterprise management. 
The function of energy-sector policy formulation is largely a political process 
that demands a careful balancfog of interests and wider economic concerns. 
It requires very different skills from those needed for the day-to-day 
management of a utility. When these functions are not separated, for example, 
when a utility is run as a government department under direct political 
control, confusion of roles occurs. Management becomes caught up in 
political processes that encourage behaviour contrary to that required for 
efficient business management, while politicians, often motivated by short 
term political considerations, can make poor management decisions. 
When the roles of policy formulation and management are institutionally 
separated, it becomes easier for managers to focus on running an effective and 
financially viable enterprise. This institutional separation promotes the 
utility's ability to fulfil the important role it has to play in policy formulation 
• 
on the basis of the economic imperatives of the enterprise. The separation of 
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Chapter Three: Governance and Structure 24 
energy policy formulation from utility management requires that utility 
governance be concerned with ensuring the efficient implementation of public 
policy, rather than day-to-day control. This leads to a preference for an 
"arm's-length" relationship between government and utilities, formalised 
transparent control, independent regulation and often the appointment of 
governing councils (World Bank 1993a). 
The role of stakeholder control 
The principle of stakeholder participation, has been established in Eskom's 
Electricity Council and in forums such as the National Electrification Forum 
(NELF). Any analysis of governance in South Africa has to include a review 
of the potential role of stakeholders. 
Power to effect control over the ESI is demanded by many stakeholders, 
whether they are represented on a governing board or not. These players 
include government, owners, management, labour, suppliers, consumers, 
(other) groups from civil society and often, lending agencies. The demand for 
"accountability" is, to a large extent, a demand for some form of stakeholder 
control. A review of ESI stakeholders would be incomplete without 
highlighting their interests in exercising a level of control over the industry. 
• Governments demand control over the ESI in order to implement public 
policy. Countries that allocate significant powers and functions to sub-
national government have to decide which tier of government will 
control electricity supply. 
• Owners, whether public or private, demand control in terms of property 
rights. Their control is often mediated by a regulator, indirectly 
representing the interests of other stakeholders .. In practice, the state as 
owner could cede most of its control to an appointed regulator or 
governing board. Private owners will not often voluntarily cede control. 
• Management control the day-to-day operational decisions in the 
organisation within the governance framework. They usually wish to 
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• 
increase the size of the system under their control, and thus have an 
propensity to influence investment decisions. 
Labour, as a central factor of production, demands control, often through 
its role in wage and service condition negotiations. They also have an 
interest in influencing the overall policy for the ESI in as far as it effects 
growth in the inoustry and in the broader economy. 
• The suppliers of fuel, goods and services have an incentive to control ESI 
decisions, especially those that affect investment plans. 
• Consumers demand control over the services delivered to them. 
Although they also have influence through national government as 
voters2, through private capital or co-operatives as shareholders, and 
through trade unions a~ members, consumers also demand direct control 
as central stakeholders. Other groups from civil society, such as 
environmental protection groups, also demand a say in utility decisions. 
• Multilateral and other lending agencies demand control to ensure the 
"successful" implementation of the funded projects, and the repayment 
of the loans they have made. 
Assuming that lending agencies, management and suppliers have a lesser 
right in playing a role in governance than other stakeholders, the roles of key 
stakeholders are evaluated as follows below. 
In democratic countries, consumers (the most important group of 
stakeholders) are indirectly represented by a government which is elected by 
them. The advantage of this route of representation is that sectoral interests 
have, in theory, been politically balanced and mediated by other national 
governing concerns. It is on this basis that a democratic government can take 
a dominant role in controlling the industry. Although they should not replace 
2A new experience for black South Africans who will go to the polls for the first time in 
April 1994 in the country's first democratic elections. 
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Chapter Three: Governance and Structure 26 
the legitimate political process, direct consumer representatives in the ESI 
governing process could, on the other hand, mediate policy emanating from 
government which is probably political party-based, on the basis of their 
expertise in the service demands and interests of the specific consumer sectors 
that they represent. The involvement of stakeholders will thus enhance the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the policies that finally emerge from the 
process. 
Industrial and commercial organisations, which are not necessarily represented 
by the government, being central players in a market economy, have an 
important role in this context. In South Africa, strong pressure will exist to 
cross-subsidise small, mostly new domestic consumers with revenue generated 
from industrial, commercial and established domestic consumers. 
Stakeholders could have common or conflicting interests, and it is thus 
important that all interests are represented in the governance process. A 
comparison of Eskom's tariffs with those of a wide range of local authority 
tariffs is revealing with regard to their respective governance processes. 
Eskom's tariffs are generally more cost-reflective than those of municipalities, 
who tend to overcharge their industrial and commercial consumers. The 
stakeholder representation in Eskom's Electricity Council, which includes a 
wide range of industrial, commercial, mining and established domestic 
consumers (i.e. white municipalities), largely explains its more balanced tariffs. 
Local authority councils, on the other hand, represent only domestic 
consumers (the voters), which explains their lower domestic tariffs and higher 
industrial and commercial tariffs. 
Stakeholders should thus have a direct role to play in electricity policy 
formulation, but there are a number of problems associated with the way in 
which a stakeholder board (such as the Eskom Elect~icity Council) operates. 
Members are often passive rather than pro-active. They tend merely to react 
to management submissions (as opposed to pro-actively introducing new 
ideas) and then only when they perceive their interest to be directly affected 
by the proposals. Furthermore, they generally do not have the capacity to 
undertake their own long-term planning. In this context, the management 
board effectively has carte blanche (Morgan 1993b). More significantly, 
stakeholder board members are generally not specialists in the electricity 
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industry, and are (in the absence of a professional independent regulator) 
probably easily influenced by the management of the utility. Lastly, a 
stakeholder board that is representative of strongly opposed interests, might 
not be a very effective decision-making body, and could become immobilised 
by deadlocks or, at best, make "compromise decisions" that are based on trade-
offs, and which merely reflect the balance of power on the board. 
Stakeholders thus cannot always adequately supervise a utility and may 
require additional support; a role that could be performed by a regulator (to 
be discussed later). 
On balance, it can be concluded that in addition to government, stakeholders 
(i.e. consumers and labour) have a limited, but important and direct role to 
play in pursuing their interests in electricity policy formulation and in utility 
supervision. 
3.2.2 Ownership 
Public policy on the most appropriate ownership of the ESI has seen dramatic 
changes over the last century. South African governmental policies have 
closely mirrored international developments. After allowing early private 
initiatives to provide the mines with electricity in South Africa, the state 
intervened in 1922 by creating the Electricity Supply Commission (Escom). 
The aim was to co-ordinate and extend the supply of electricity as an 
important infrastructural service, in order to facilitate industrial development 
(Merz & McLellan 1920) .. The effective monopolisation (and nationalisation) 
by Escom of most the generation industry after 1948 reflected similar 
developments elsewhere in the world3. Towards the end of the 1980s, much 
emphasis was placed on privatisation and the introduction of competition into 
the ESI in industrialised countries such as the UK, Europe and the USA, and 
in developing countries such as Argentina, Chile, Tha~land and China. Again, 
South Africa followed suit, and the privatisation of Eskom was set as the 
government's first target in its privatisation programme (State President's 
opening speech in parliament 1988, quoted in Horwitz 1993: 44 - 45). The 
initiative was sidelined as a result of strong opposition from Eskom's 
3Similar developments took place in, inter alia, Argentina (Hasson et al 1992: 10), the UK 
and France (McGowan & Thomas 1992:) after World War II. 
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consumers and the powerful South African trade unions (Clare 1989; CRIC 
1989). 
ESI privatisation involves a process of transferring the ownership of public 
enterprises into private hands, and is usually combined with the introduction 
of competition, often through appropriate regulatory changes. Proponents of 
privatisation assume that competition and private profit motives will 
necessarily lead to an improvement in ESI efficiency. However, efficiency 
improvements can also be encouraged within different public utility models. 
Also, improving co-operation within the ind~stry might reap larger benefits 
than attempting to foster competition, especially in developing countries 
{Teplitz-Sembitzky 1990). These issues are discussed below. 
Improved efficiency 
For the proponents of privatisation, a central concern is to avoid the 
inefficiencies in investment planning, construction and operation, which have 
occurred in the past in public utilities in industrialised and newly 
industrialising countries, but especially in developing countries. Tenenbaum 
et al (1992: 1134) argues that the underlying reason for these inefficiencies is 
that "when the state owns, nobody owns; and when nobody owns, nobody 
cares". It is generally argued by proponents of privatisation that managers of 
privately-owned enterprises, in contrast to their publicly employed 
counterparts, operate within an incentive structure that links their 
remuneration and career prospects to their ability to ensure an adequate 
return on the capital invested in the enterprise. They will therefore (barring 
monopoly powers in large markets) be much more effective in improving 
planning, construction and operational efficiencies. Improving the 
effectiveness of management incentives is thus an important motivation for 
privatisation. 
Recent research in the UK power market has indicated that although the 
competitive privatisation of the power sector resulted in lower costs for power 
companies, these costs were not passed on to consumers in the form of lower 
tariffs. On the contrary, profits have soared and tariffs were found to be 
between 20 per cent and 25 per cent higher than they would have been under 
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public ownership (MacKerron 1993). This has resulted in a large shift of 
economic surplus from consumers to shareholders (MacKerron 1994). 
Hasson (1992: 6) also reports that after privatisation and the introduction of 
competition in the bulk market during 1991/92 bulk electricity prices were 
significantly higher in Argentina. Although it is still too early to draw.final 
conclusions, preliminary results seem to indicate that while privatisation can 
lead to an increase in micro-efficiency in the operation of utilities, this does 
not necessarily mean that these benefits are passed on to consumers in the 
form of lower prices or improved service. 
The problem with the incentives under which managers of privately owned 
enterprises act, is that they are primarily aimed at maximising the return on 
investment over the short- to medium-term, rather than at the sustainable 
provision of an essential public service. 
Private capital perceives an increased risk when evaluating the return on total 
assets, and making future investment decisions in a competitive environment 
with increased uncertainties; it also requires a higher rate of return than a 
monopolistic public sector utility. Risk averseness leads to a preference for 
shorter project cycles and lower sunk investments (even if this results in 
higher fuel costs). This ultimately results in decisions being taken that are 
very different from what would have been the case if the optimal allocation 
of national energy resources was the major priority, rather than obtaining a 
high rate of return. The prudent exploitation of natural energy resources, 
such as a large hydro-electrical potential (for example, in Brazil and 
Argentina), or vast low-grade coal deposits (for example, in South Africa4), 
often requires significant investments that will only be recovered over long 
periods. Such investments are generally unattractive. to private investors - a 
situation that is presently giving rise to concern in China, Argentina and 
Chile, where present patterns of private investment result in lower fuel and 
capital efficiencies, and a sub-optimal allocation of national energy resources 
(Wirtshafter & Shih 1990; Hasson et al 1992). 
4Advanced technology employed in Eskom power stations enables the burning of coal 
with a low calorific value, thus freeing coal resources of higher quality to be utilised for other 
purposes, or to be exported. · 
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The privatisation of energy investment planning and a reliance on "market 
mechanisms" only could exclude non-monetised considerations such as 
environmental externalities and security of supply, and could also potentially 
result in a deterioration of efficiency in the natiqnal economy over the 
medium- to long-term (Fells & Lucas 1992: 387). 
The debate about private or public ownership of the ESI relates to the roles 
that utilities can play as public service organisations or as commercial 
enterprises. Publicly-owned utilities operate under a service motive, while 
privately-owned utilities are motivated by the pursuit of profit. The essential 
question is whether an enterprise, motivated by the desire for profit, will 
deliver a sustainable service more efficiently and cheaply than a service-
orientated public enterprise. 
If the issue is really one of effective management incentives (or motives), as 
argued above, it would not be the correct approach to be fixated on a single 
option for incentive improvement, i.e. privatisation. Recent World Bank policy 
literature is rightly concerned with the contradictory and ineffective 
management incentives and the lack of management accountability that is 
often found in publicly owned enterprises. They correctly conclude that this 
is essentially a problem of governance and ineffective regulation. But the 
World Bank (1993a) then goes on to suggest privatisation as a solution 
(thereby potentially introducing a host of new problems), instead of also 
exploring ways in which present practices of public governance could be 
revised and adapted to promote effective utility management. 
Yarrow (1989) states that in situations where significant market failures prevail 
(for example, monopoly conditions and environmental externalities), it is not 
ownership that matters, but regulation. De Oliveira (1991: 88) argues that the 
"dichotomy between privatization and state control is a mistaken one. 
Developing countries should rather look for a rational balance between public 
and private ownership, but most importantly under a new regulatory regime" [my 
emphasis]. Experience with public sector utilities in recent years clearly shows 
that "when the state owns", it could easily result in a situation where "nobody 
cares", but the many examples of gains made by public utilities since World 
War II in Latin America (for example, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico), 
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Europe (for example, UK and France) and South Africa, illustrate that public 
ownership provides <l:n opportunity for rational integrated resource planning 
that could have outcomes superior to those that might result from private 
sector power planning. 
Competition or co-operation: The need for co-ordination 
In their attempt to establish the necessary co-ordination to obtain an efficient 
and effective application of resources in the ESI over time (for example, in 
investment planning, generation dispatch, operation and maintenance), 
decision-makers are faced with two choices: simply put these are whether to 
place emphasis on a process of rational planning and co-operation, or whether 
to rely on a motive of maximising the return on capital in an environment 
where prices are determined by competitive market pressures, to determine 
priorities. The former option is an approximate description of the case where 
the supply is undertaken by a public or private utility that has been granted 
monopoly status. The latter option is illustrated by the case of the UK's ESI, 
where privatisation was combined with the introduction of competition. The 
argument that privatisation results in improved efficiency is, to a large extent, 
based on the assumption that effective competition can be introduced into the 
ESL 
However, many have questioned whether effective competition is possible 
within the ESL For example, Prime Minister Jan Smuts in 1937, at the opening 
of Escom House in Johannesburg, argued that electricity for South African 
industry was 
"as cheap as anywhere in the world because wasteful competition had 
been eliminated .... There will always be a very large field for private 
capital to operate in, but there are certain industries which experience 
has taught us can be driven better by the Government without loss 
through wasteful competition" (quoted in Horwitz 1993: 5). 
At that time it was generally accepted that the ESI was most efficiently 
operated as a monopoly, whether it was privately owned and tightly 
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regulated, or publicly owned. Co-ordination and planning activities were 
based on co-operation rather than competition. 
The development of interlinked transmission grids and modern pricing theory 
contributed to renewed debate in the 1980s, which questioned the view that 
the ESI is a natural monopoly. The desirability of monopoly supply and the 
possibility of introducing competition have been re-examined. There has been 
a movement towards "deregulation" in the USA, Australia and Europe, and 
full privatisation and competition in England and Wales5 and New Zealand. 
It is now widely accepted in most industrialised countries (with the notable 
exception of France) that competition in generation is possible and desirable 
· - even if it has not yet fully been attained - and that competition by suppliers 
for the provision of an unbundled service6 to end-consumers could even be 
instituted. 
In South Africa, Eskom's large over-capacity in generation exemplifies the 
potential planning weaknesses of a public monopoly, and limits the present 
possibilities of introducing generation competition. However, Eskom power 
stations are presently operated as virtually self-contained units with separate 
cost centres and accounts, and limited benchmark competition is practised. 
The large electrification backlog in South Africa, high capital costs and the 
highly politicised demand for affordable electricity (low tariffs) makes it 
inconceivable that private distributors would compete to supply electricity to 
poor township residents. Electrification objectives would probably be easier 
achieved through a publicly owned enterprise with a clear policy mandate. 
5Under the current circumstances whereby the two largest generating companies control 
more than 60 per cent of the available capacity, the level of real competition in the UK 
generation business is questionable; and increasingly, the regulator has to guard against 
monopoly powers. It seems that this is largely a result of the hasty way that the industry 
was privatised~ and therefore does not reflect conclusively on the outcome of a more 
carefully planned privatisation and "deregulation" programme. 
hGenerally the distribution of electricity to end-consumers takes the form of a bundled 
service whereby the energy and distribution (transport) is provided as one service. In an 
attempt to extend supply-competition to end-users, these services can be unbundled so that 
consumers can choose a different energy suppliers to those supplying to their distribution 
utility. Consumers in England and Wales with a supply of more than 1 MW are currently 
entitled to choose their bulk supplier. According to current plans all households will be 
allowed to choose their own bulk suppliers by 1998. 
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Co-operation or competition do not necessarily imply either public or private 
ownership, although competition often requires a degree of private ownership. 
It is conceivable that the considerable self-generation capacity of large 
municipalities and industry, and the possibility of industry turning to other 
energy sources, has acted as an effective competitive pressure on Eskom, and 
has contributed to the maintenance of low prices and an acceptable quality of 
supply (Horwitz 1993: 53). The threat of alternative bulk supply options 
available to large consumers. could work to contribute to the efficient 
management of Eskom and low tariffs in the future. 
Competition can occur in many different ways ranging from competitive 
bidding for ancillary services to competition in core services such as power 
generation. Competition for the provision of ancillary services is largely 
uncontroversial. It is the introduction of competition to the core business of 
the ESI, as discussed above, that is subject to controversy (World Bank 1993b: 
3). 
Access to finance 
The need to finance capital-intensive power sector growth has played a 
·definitive role in determining ESI ownership structures over the last century. 
Internationally, increased public involvement in the power sector after World 
War II enabled continued ESI expansion to facilitate industrial development. 
The debt crisis and r cessionary budget constraints that evolved in the 
developing countries during the 1980s have resulted in a shortage of capital 
for continued power sector investment. Whereas financing constraints led to 
the nationalisation of the power industry in many countries during the 1940s, 
they now contribute significantly to the drive for privatisation of the ESI, as 
a means of enabling further growth in the industry. The increased uncertainty 
brought about by privatisation, deregulation and competition increases the 
lender's risk exposure, and has significantly increased the cost of capital. 
Higher capital cost will dramatically affect electricity prices in developing 
economies. 
Where utilities are too close to government and political interference has 
resulted in unrealistically low tariffs which threaten financial viability, utilities 
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are unable to raise affordable finance for investment. However, a large public 
sector utility, operating at arm's-length from government in a stable policy 
environment that reduces uncertainty and lender's risk, is potentially at a 
distinct advantage concerning its ability to raise finance. Eskom provides a 
good example of the financial success that may be attained by effectively 
governed and managed public utilities. Eskom is consistently able to raise 
finance at lower interest rates than the South African government, and has 
significant foreign participation in its rand bonds.7 
Indications are that low-cost finance for electrification and capacity expansion 
will be readily available to large, public sector utilities that are not facing 
significant uncertainties about the future structure of the sector, and which are 
able to minimise the lenders' risk and ensure long-term financial viability by 
meeting their revenue requirement through over-all cost-reflective tariffs. 
Corporatisation and commercialisation 
Utilities can be effectively situated at arms-length from government by 
establishing them as public corporations. This will achieve a clearer 
separation between the governing and management functions of the utility, 
and it will be possible to improve the utility's efficiency by commercialising 
its operation and management. 
Corporatisation essentially entails the transfer of assets from a government 
ministry to a separate publicly-owned corporation. An organisation is thus 
consolidated and given an independent existence enabling it, to a large extent, 
to set its own employment and financial policies, and to enter capital markets 
independently. The total separation of government and utility bureaucracies 
is intended to increase productivity as a result of improved performance 
management, clearer accountability and greater exposure to market forces. 
Corporatisation is an effective way of establishing an arms-length relationship 
between government and a publicly owned industry. It could also be the first 
step towards (but does not necessarily lead to) privatisation. 
752 per cent of Eskom rand stock, in terms of nominal value, was held by foreign 
investors by the end of 1992 (Eskom 1993: 15). 
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An interesting example of a public corporation model that experienced 
significant problems is to be found in the ESI in England and Wales before 
privatisation. The industry was effectively an monopoly supplier and 
consisted of the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB), twelve area 
boards which retailed electricity, and the Electricity Council which acted as the 
overseer and coordinator of the whole industry (Rodriguez 1987). The 
industry operated as a public corporation within a statutory framework set out 
in Acts of Parliament, as well as non-statutory controls determined by central 
government. Although the ESI was supposed to operate at arms-length from 
government, it experienced increasingly closer government control. These 
were mainly financial controls and were initially intended to increase the 
industry's efficiency; however by the 1980s, government control was motivated 
more by political objectives, such as the pursuit of monetarist policies (Surrey 
1986). · The government intended to reduce the public sector borrowing 
requirement by limiting treasury loans, and by increasing revenue from the 
nationalised industries, through means such as requiring them to repay capital 
debts faster than planneQ. (Surrey 1986: 43).- This level of government 
interference in the ESI occurred because, in contrast to the relative financial 
independence of the public corporation model espoused above, the ESI was 
required to use the Treasury to meet its borrowing requirements, which 
subjected it to a high level of government influence over its management. To 
avoid this kind of problem, public corporations should be set up to operate 
with a high level of financial independence, and free access to financial 
markets. Corporations should also not be expected to make transfer payments 
to government for reasons other than to pay back loans with clearly contracted 
repayment schedules. 
In South Africa, a public corporation can be established in a number of ways. 
A public undertaking can typically be incorporated in terms of a special act, 
as is the case with the Eskom Act (No. 40 of 1987) which established Eskom; 
or the corporation could be established in terms of existing legislation, such 
as South Africa's Companies Act (No. 61 of 1973). In this case, the shares 
could be owned by a government department and limited equity participation 
by private investors could also be a possibility. A number of difficulties, 
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however, are associated with the issuing of shares as part of a corporatisation 
process: 
• It will prove difficult, if not impossible, to determine the value of the 
undertaking's assets. 
• The undertaking will remain a monopoly and the existence of 
shareholders alone will not necessarily guarantee more efficient 
management or cheaper electricity. 
• If a stakeholder model of governance is favoured, the issuing of shares 
to parties other than the stakeholders, or even to stakeholders in a 
different proportion to their voting rights on the stakeholder governing 
body (for example, if all the shares are owned by a government 
department), could lead to a situation where shareholders demand a say 
in the utility affairs in proportion to their share ownership. In such a 
case, a conflict of interest could develop between the shareholders, and 
the stakeholders and the stakeholder governance system could be 
undermined. 
A process of corporatisation is usually combined with commercialisation, with 
the aim of improving management efficiency. Commercialisation means that 
business conduct is based on commercial principles. Organisations are treated 
like commercial enterprises: they have to earn a market-related return on 
equity, conform to commercial accounting standards, be exposed to "market 
discipline"; often the payment of taxes and dividends is also involved. 
Corporatisation and commercialisation provide a way of reforming public 
utilities with the aim of exposing the organisation to discipline enforced by the 
market, while retaining the advantages of public ownership. 
With the exception that Eskom does not pay taxes or dividends, and has no 
shares, it has to a large degree been corporatised and commercialised in terms 
of, inter alia, sections 3, 4, 12, 20 and 22 of the Eskom Act (No. 40 of 1987). 
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3.2.3 Regulation 
Governance (the relationship between the state and the ESI) is affected by 
ownership and stakeholder involvement (discussed above), but it also, 
crucially, involves regulation. In this thesis, regulation does not refer to all 
forms of government control over the industry; and neither does it refer to the 
political process of energy policy formulation. ESI regulation usually involves 
at least some degree of public price control, but normally extends to control 
over other areas of utility conduct, such as levels of service, and planning and 
investment decisions. In a competitive environment, however, the regulator's 
focus is more likely to be on defining and enforcing the rules of the game. 
Cordukes (1990) defines regulation rather narrowly as "the enforcement and 
monitoring of a set of operational rules to meet defined objectives by an 
appointed autonomous agency accountable to government". The World Bank 
(1993a: 9) refers to regulation within the specific context of private or arm's-
length public enterprises. For the purposes of this thesis, regulation will refer 
to professional control exercised over public arm's-length, or private industry 
by an autonomous public agency, with the aim of defining operational rules 
and providing independent review and intervention in order to meet the 
objectives of public policy. 
In countries with corporatised public utilities, an additional (often dominant) 
form of public control often exists in the form of a board of stakeholder 
directors appointed by government.8 Although stakeholder control is often 
loosely referred to as regulation, this thesis treats it as a related but distinct 
function.' 
Theories of regulation 
Regulation may be better understood by referring to the following theories, 
reviewed by Horwitz (1989: 22-45), largely in the context of private investor-
owned utilities in the USA. Although the theories are highly simplified in the 
summaries presented here, they nevertheless illustrate the value of a critical 
analysis of the governance system. 
8Both EdF in France and Eskom have a stakeholder "board of directors". 
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"Public interest" theory 
Public interest theories explain the genesis of regulatory agencies as a response 
to the perceived conflict between private corporations and the general public. 
The establishment of regulation is seen as a democratic victory for "the people" 
over private corporate interests, through the exercising of the powers of the 
democratic state. Progressive public interest theory is based on a rather naive 
faith in the administrative ability of a regulating bureaucracy to protect the 
voiceless consumers and to ensure rationality and fairness in the economy. 
Regulatory failure theory 
According to Horwitz "Regulatory failure theorists are public interest theorists 
betrayed" (1989: 27). These theorists assume the public interest as the raison 
d'etre and theoretical standard for regulators and then proceed to examine the 
practice of regulation, often finding that the public interest has been subverted 
by regulators who serve the interests of the industries being regulated. 
Generally this is explained as the result of over-identification of the regulator 
with the industry that is being regulated. This is largely argued by influence 
models, which suggest that regulated industries inevitably come to have 
undue influence over the regulators. 
Conspiracy theory 
Conspiracy theorists share the same opinion of the results of regulation as 
adherents of regulatory failure theory. It is in their understanding of the 
origin of regulation that they differ from the two previous theories. Theirs is 
the radical argument that regulatory agencies are set up in order to serve the 
interest of private industries. Conspiracy theo~ists also criticise the 
establishment of protected (private) monopolies with "public utility status",9 
alleging that this constitutes a victory for capital in co-opting the modern state 
(Gray in Horwitz 1989: 32). 
9ln the United States private companies providing an essential public service under 
monopoly conditions (such as electricity) are given "public utility" status, whereby they are 
placed under the regulatory authority of the state Public Utility Commissions. 
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Organisational theory 
"Organisational theory" refers to a group of studies of regulatory policy that 
attempts to explain regulatory behaviour in terms of organisational theories. 
One variant holds that regulators will be preoccupied with organisational 
preservation and the employment of regulator personnel, thus being 
regulation-oriented rather than industry~oriented. They will thus attempt to 
solve all problems in the industry by doing what regulators do: making more 
and improved regulations. Another variant of the theory holds that regulators 
will tend to avoid conflict and attempt to make compromises with all the 
parties involved, thereby forming consensus networks that reflect the effective 
balance of power, rather than acting as an critical input to the governance of 
the electricity industry. 
The capitalist state theory 
The capitalist state theory is based on a theory of the state as structurally 
dependent on the private accumulation of capital, through corporate taxation. 
Private industry, destabilised by the anarchy of the market, calls on the state 
and its extensions to regulate the market in order to ensure rationality and the 
management of externalities. The apparent paradox of an "independent" state 
acting in the interest of capital is explained by the state's structural dependence 
on the private accumulation of capital. 
A comprehensive theory of regulation would have to analyse both the genesis 
and practice of the regulator, as well as its interest in self-preservation as an 
organisation. It would also hav~ to account for the democratic state 
functioning under the dual constraints of having to facilitate the private 
accumulation of capital by securing economic growth and performance on the 
one hand, and on the other, having to pursue legitimation by meeting 
democratic demands for equity and due process (Horwitz 1989: 43 - 44). It 
would also have to incorporate an understanding of the behaviour of 
organisations that are being regulated, and would have to suggest ways of 
understanding the behaviour and motivation of managers. In this regard, for 
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example, there is an important difference between regulating private and 
public enterprises. Explained rather crudely, managers of investor-owned 
enterprises have an incentive to maximise profits by virtue of their private 
ownership. Managers of publicly-owned enterprises, left to their own 
devices, could face a very weak or contradictory incentive structure and thus 
be left with few performance imperatives. In both cases, regulation has an 
important, albeit different, role to play. Given the preference expressed for 
arm's-length public ownership, the rest of this section is aimed at analysing 
governance processes based on this model. 
The role of regulation under different ownership regimes 
It is important to identify how the role of regulation changes under different 
ownership regimes - a distinction that is often neglected in the South African 
debate. It would make no sense, for example, to uncritically transplant the 
experience of regulated investor-owned utilities in the USA to the South 
African context, where the ESI would probably be publicly owned. 
ln the case of private enterprise, as has been noted above, managers tend to 
be given stronger incentives to generate financial profits, rather than to 
provide a public service. Where they have been granted monopoly status (as 
in the USA), tariffs have generally been subjected to rate-of-return regulation. 
Regulation is being extended more generally to utility conduct as a result of 
concern about the environment, and the effect that private investment 
decisions can have over the long term on costs.10 
Insofar as competition has been introduced to an industry that is largely 
privately owned (as in the UK), regulators are primarily concerned with 
maintaining competition (or, more often, attaining real competition) and 
establishing the rules of the game. Prices are left to be. determined by demand 
and supply in the market. 
10ln a competitive bulk market, private generation investors, preferring shorter project 
cycles, could make investment choices in terms of technology and fuel combinations that 
result in higher costs and tariffs. 
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Practically all publicly owned utilities operate under monopolistic conditions 
and, as noted above, could face very weak, or contradictory, incentive 
structures. The most important consideration for any regulator, in this 
context, is that managers be given specific incentives to improve performance. 
Gains in operational and investment efficiency would generally only be 
achieved by the establishment of a strong incentive framework with effective 
performance indicators. The regulator would have to supervise and audit the 
whole spectrum of performance outcomes. However, it would be much easier 
to install a public service ethic and obtain management co-operation in the 
case of public ownership, as there is no "alternative" agenda to maximise 
profits. In a context of strong and effective governance, the role of a regulator 
would be crucial, given the limited role that stakeholders play in practice. 
With this large and rather technical task at hand, the regulator would require 
strong technical skills, and should constitute a centre of technical expertise 
outside the utility. 
In a developing country with a government under pressure to deliver 
affordable social services, a regulator might also have the role of protecting 
the ESI from undue government interference in day-to-day operational 
decisions. 
The respective roles of a regulator and stakeholder board under public 
ownership 
The respective roles assigned to a regulator and stakeholders (including 
government) are determined by the trade-off between "technocratic rationality 
(expertise)" versus "inter-subjective consensus (politics)" as modes of public 
decision-making (Horwitz 1992: 40). Electricite de France argue that the 
introduction of an independent technocratic regulator "may be a good idea", 
but that alone it is insufficient (World Bank 1993b: 59). They argue that there 
is a de facto "regulatory body" that involves stakeholders such as government 
ministries and labour (similar to the stakeholders discussed under "The role 
of stakeholder control" above) and point to the importance of involving 
stakeholders: 
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This de facto body may hold contradictory views, but these relate to real 
problems and most of them should be considered. 
The real challenge is designing institutions and procedures for co-
ordinating these different views, so as to make efficient decisions. Taken 
alone, the Anglo-Saxon concept of the independent [technocratic] agency 
does not answer the question. Indeed, it may even make it more 
complex, depending on the country and its institutions. 
Although the role of a technocratic agency is not precluded, EdF considers the 
incorporation of a plurality of stakeholders as fundamentally important. 
Given the large role reserved for stakeholders, a regulator's role is to do what 
stakeholders are weakest at: the pro-active supervision of utility management 
and investment planning on the basis of technocratic rationality. Its 
responsibility should thus essentially be to inform, mediate and audit the 
governing processes on the basis of its technical expertise. 
The role established for stakeholders, on the other hand, should enable them 
to do what they do best: look after their own interests. They should do this 
by participating in the formulation of electricity policy and by co-supervising 
the implementation of public electricity policy by the utilities. 
Modes of regulation 
For the purpose of this thesis, three generic modes of formal regulation are 
identified: rate-of-return regulation, incentive regulation and performance 
contracting. 
Rate-of-return regulation 
Under rate-of-return (ROR) regulation, profits are regulated by determining 
tariffs on a cost-plus basis, with the aim of assuring the investor an adequate 
return on the capital invested. The most important criticism of ROR 
regulation is that it provides little incentive to improve efficiency and cut 
costs, but rather allows for increased costs to be passed on to consumers, 
despite regulatory lag and the risk to utilities that costs will be disallowed by 
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the regulator. 11 It could also provide utilities with an incentive to inflate the 
asset base that is used to calculate the required rate of return, leading to over-
investment or "gold plating" (Horwitz 1992). 
Most investor-owned (private) utilities in the USA operate under ROR 
regulation imposed by the state Public Utilities Commissions. ROR regulation 
requires that accurate information on the operation of the utility be available. 
TI1e amount of work required to implement the system can be considerable. 
The Public Utility Commissions in the USA typically employ between 120 and 
650 personnel, mostly professional staff (Morgan 1993a: 53). 
Incentive regulation 
Incentive regulation refers to a group of regulatory approaches that attempt 
to implement a hands-off approach to regulation by specifying clearly 
measurable performance goals, and by linking incentives to their achievement. 
Instead of focusing the regulators' efforts on the application of resources as in 
the case of ROR regulation, incentive regulation concerns itself with the 
outcome of the utility's actions. A well known example of incentive regulation 
is found in Britain, where the regional electricity companies in England and 
Wales are price-cap regulated with the commonly used formula RPI - X + Y. 
The retail price index (RPI, a measure of inflation) is taken as the basis for 
price increases, and is then adjusted by a small percentage (the "X" factor) 
which the company must make up in increased efficiency, plus or minus an 
allowance for any other factors ("Y"), such as a provision for any exceptional 
investment requirements (McGowan & Thomas 1992: 157). The price-cap 
mechanism, despite its price focus and apparent simplicity, risks the same 
shortcomings as ROR regulation (McGowan 1991: 7). The system provides for 
a cost-of-service review every five years with the aim of determining a price 
which becomes the new base for the RPI-X formula; however, as Tenenbaum 
et al (1992: 1145) point out, it does have the advantage of a built-in regulatory 
lag of five years (in other words, the cost-of-service review, which is similar 
to a ROR cost allowance, is only undertaken every five years). 
11Tenenbaum et al (1992: 1144) argue that although both the regulatory lag between when 
a cost is incurred and when it is allowed by the regulator and the risk that an investment 
expense might be disallowed act as weak incentives to cut costs, ROR has very few 
incentives to improve efficiency. 
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It could be argued that a fundamental difference between ROR regulation and 
price-cap regulation is that under ROR regulation, the regulator has to police 
costs and not quality, and under price-cap regulation, it has to police quality 
and not costs (Tenenbaum et al 1992: 1158 footnote). As pointed out above, 
an utility under ROR regulation does not have such a strong incentive to cut 
costs, and could even be tempted to inflate its asset base. It would thus be 
unlikely to skimp on quality of supply, the costs of which it can legitimately 
pass on to consumers. Under price-cap regulation, on the other hand, utilities 
cannot easily pass costs on to consumers, and would thus have a stronger 
incentive to implement cost-cutting measures, some of which might 
compromise the quality of their electricity service (Besant-Jones 1992: 148). 
Performance Contracting 
Whereas ROR and price-cap regulation are normally applied in industrialised 
countries with largely privatised ESis, performance contracting is increasingly 
being applied in countries with publicly-owned ESis. Performance contracting 
is an attempt to give utilities more autonomy within the framework of a 
performance agreement. Utilities are held accountable for desired outcomes, 
as measured by a negotiated set of performance indicators covering a wider 
scope than simply return on investment or electricity price. The principles of 
performance contracting are also used in affirmage and concession 
arrangements.12 · 
In countries with publicly owned utilities that are both government-operated 
and governed, performance contracting positions utilities at arm's-length from 
government. Governments thus limit their interference in utility affairs to a 
minimum, enabling greater managerial and financial autonomy for the utility. 
Government still determines overall policy, sets objectives and coordinates 
sector development planning. Government also remains responsible for 
establishing the legal framework to protect the interests of various 
stakeholders (World Bank 1993a). 
12 Affirmage refers to an arrangement between a government and a foreign firm for the 
management of a public utility. Concession refers to contract in terms of which a public 
authority assigns the task of supplying a public sen'ice to a private party. 
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The most common form of performance contracting is through the 
establishment ·of a contract plan (CP), as is the case with the national 
electricity utilities in France, Morocco, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Ivory Coast 
(Cordukes 1990: 16). Eskom's pricing compact, 13 although narrowly defined, 
also bears some resemblance to a contract plan. 
A contract plan is a negotiated agreement between government as the owner 
of an enterprise, and the management of a utility. It contains details of the 
intentions, obligation and responsibilities of the two parties over a specific 
time period - typically three to five years. The resources available to the 
utility and the constraints acting on it will be detailed. Financial and physical 
performance measures will be agreed upon, usually covering areas such as 
productivity targets, price levels, sales and investment strategies, and self-
financing and debt strategies (World Bank 1993a). The frequency and process 
of the evaluation will be detailed and the appropriate reward and remedial 
measures agreed to. CPs will typically give managers more freedom in most 
I 
aspects of management, including remuneration policies, in return for the 
required level of performance. Ultimately, senior managers are held 
personally accountable for performance. Contract plans detail the obligations 
of both utilities and government. Government also has an obligation to ensure 
an appropriate environment within which the utility will be enabled to fulfil 
its task. At the annual performance evaluation, the performance of both 
parties must be evaluated. 
The advantages of performance contracting spring from the fact that all the 
different pressures acting on a utility can be channelled into one negotiating 
"forum", which will ensure that performance objectives are able to be set 
according to the full equation of considerations. Not only will this result in 
more realistic performance targets being set, but it will present management 
with a coherent task and associated accountability. 
uln this compact covering the period from 1992 to 1996, Eskom undertakes to (1) reduce 
the price of electricity by 20 per cent over five years; (2) increase productivity by 20 per cent 
over five years; (3) improve its debt equity ratio; (4) maintain quality of service at 
international standards; (5) further the aim of electrification without subsidising from other 
consumer classes; (6) use excess capacity to sell electricity to industrialists at prices above 
short-run marginal costs; (7) base price adjustments on Eskom's revenue requirement; and 
renegotiate the compact if economic indicators should move outside a specified economic 
framework. 
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With regards to price setting under performance contracting, Electricite de 
France argues that "regulations should not move sharply away from cost-plus 
towards fixed-price arrangements" (World Bank 1993b: 59). The concern is 
that under strict fixed-price (price-cap) regulation, the utility's financial risk 
might be increased, which in turn would lead to an increase in cost of capital. 
It is thus proposed that strong incentive mechanisms, such as price-capping, 
be limited to operating and maintenance costs. 
Besant-Jones argues that: 
To be consistent with the objective of commercializing state-owned 
utilities, and in particular accountability, a performance contract should 
be made between the government - represented by a  administrative 
ministry - and the Board of Directors of a utility, rather than directly 
with the utility managers. Government should leave to the directors the 
task of motivating managers and staff to meet performance targets. 
(1992: 150) 
It would depend on the nature of the board of directors whether it would be 
best for the board or management to be the contracting party. If the board 
consists mostly of industrialists and others, appointed for their experience and 
expertise, it would make sense for the board to be the contracting party. On 
the other hand, if, for example, regionally based .distribution utilities have 
stakeholder boards, as is the case with the Eskom Electricity Council, it would 
probably be more practical to make management the contracting party. 
Stakeholder board members will generally be less skilled at the task at hand, 
and could be divided among themselves, making it difficult to negotiate a 
sensible contract plan. Giving management, acting under board supervision, 
a more prominent role under such circumstances will probably · result in 
improved contract plans. 
The success of performance contracting is limited by the information on which 
the initial plan is developed, and the performance evaluation is based. 
Effective management information systems, including budgeting, accounting 
and reporting systems, will be important throughout the performance 
management process (Cordukes 1990: 42). Poor quality of information flowing 
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from the utility could result from the failure of management information 
systems due to limited capacity in the utility, management bias, or deliberate 
manipulation. A regulator could play an important role by providing 
independent reviews and audits of information used in the CP negotiation 
process. 
Besant-Jones (1992: 149) argues that government should not be the judge of its 
own performance, but that an independent body should perform such an 
evaluation. The need for independent utility and government performance 
audits, and the need for a body to deal with contingencies in between 
planning periods, all point towards the importance of the role of an 
independent regulator to support a CP based governance system. 
Structure of the regulator 
There are some important factors that should guide the establishment of a 
regulatory authority. 
A strong case is to be made for situating the regulatory authority in one 
central body responsible for the whole industry. In the case of both Argentina 
(Hasson et al 1992: 17-18) and the USA (Tenenbaum et al 1992: 1136), 
problems have been reported when regulatory functions (governance in the 
case of Argentina) are split between the federal and state levels. As electricity 
systems become increasingly interconnected, the reliability of supply, 
effectiveness, and allocative and productive efficiency depend more heavily 
on the successful functioning and co-ordination of the system as a whole. 
When, under split governance, subsets of an integrated system operate under 
contradictory governing paradigms, problems with performance will result. 
The effective autonomy of local government distributors in South Africa, and 
the ineffectual national regulator (the Electricity Con,trol Board) are the most 
important causes of the problems currently experienced in the industry. 
In developing countries, the scarcity of skilled personnel is a further reason 
for establishing a single regulator, and raises the question of whether the 
regulator should not also control other industries, such as telecommunications 
and transport. Given that the role of a regulator is conceived here within a 
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very specific governing paradigm, it is assumed that unless an industry 
occupies a position in the economy similar to that of electricity, and has 
similar ownership, it would probably not be practical to place it under the 
same regulator. 
3.3 Structure 
The structure of the ESI essentially refers to the way in which the basic 
functions in the industry are grouped and institutionalised. This section is 
aimed at identifying broad principles or performance guidelines for a future 
ESI structure. 
3.3.1 Determinants ofthe ESI structure 
The development of the ESI structure and changes therein are generally 
determined by the interaction of a multitude of (often interdependent) factors. 
Some of these determinants are unrelated to the ESI in their origin, while 
others arise from within the industry. These factors can also be detrimental, 
neutral or advantageous to the performance of the ESL Some of the most 
important determinants are discussed below. 
Changes in the governing paradigm 
Three factors in the governing paradigm can affect the ESI structure, namely, 
changes in social and economic policy; changes in the preferred ESI 
ownership; and national constitutional changes. 
A significant change in the orientation of government social and economic 
policy could result in structural changes in the industry. The active pursuit 
of industrialisation by the governments of the UK, Argentina and South Africa 
after World War II, for example, resulted in the nationalisation and 
restructuring of the ESI in those counties. Similarly, it is the move away from 
apartheid policies, together with a greater emphasis 011 the equitable provision 
of social services, that has precipitated the present move to restructure the 
South African ESL 
More specifically, a change in the preferred ownership paradigm could result 
in structural change in the industry. The choice of public ownership as a 
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result of the nationalisation programmes of the 1940s referred to above, 
generally resulted in the amalgamation of separate companies into a public 
monopoly. Similarly, the privatisation programmes of recent years often 
resulted in the break-up of public sector generation monopolies, as in the case 
of the Central Electricity Generating Board in. the lJK and in New Zealand.14 
',' 
The constitutional development of a country could effectively dictate the 
structural development of the ESL It is inconceivable that a public monopoly 
such as Electricite de France could have developed in a federal country such 
as the USA. The allocation of powers and functions to sub-national 
government in South Africa's future constitution could effectively foreclose on 
certain structural options for the ESL Strong regional government, for 
instance, would probably disqualify the possibility of establishing one national 
distributor and, at the same time, would establish regions as "natural" 
boundaries for distributors. 
The need to exploit economies of scope 
The development of technologically specialised base-load, intermediate- and 
peak-load power stations, together with the construction of high-voltage 
transmission lines that enable the ·interconnection of networks and power 
stations, increase the potential to exploit economies of scope. This has 
implications for the structure of the ESL If investment planning and 
operations control are coordinated on a national basis, it is possible to 
minimise the national surplus capacity in terms of base-, intermediate- and 
peak-load stations while, at the same time, co-ordinating the operation of the 
system to minimise fuel costs. It thus makes sense to centrally co-ordinate 
generation and transmission investment planning and system operations. 
The need to exploit economies of scale 
The quest to optimise economies of scale is also dependent 'on the available 
set of technology. In coal-based generation, for example, the development of 
14A programme by the Argentine government during 1966-1980, aimed at decentralising 
and commercialising generation, ironically resulted in the government controlling more than 
99 per cent of the generation capacity by 1980, as a result of the failure of private enterprise 
in the difficult economic circumstances in the energy sector at the time (Hasson et al: 1992 
15-16). 
RESTRUCTURING THE SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
Chapter Three: Governance and Structure 50 
coal-fired generation technology has led · to the construction of larger 
generating units. Other developments in tr~nsport, information processing 
and communications technology also affect the optimal sU:ucture of the ESI. 
It has not been conclusively shown that economies of scale exist in the 
distribution of electricity. An "unwritten norm" 'of a minimum of 10 000 
consumers per undertaker is acknowledged 'by the DMEA (1992: 21), The 
DMEA (1992) also cite van der Merwe's report of an inverse correlation 
between the size of distributors (measured in-terms of annual electricity sales), 
and the average price per unit of electricity sold in South Africa. As the 
DMEA points out, the reduction in electricity price can be explained by 
increased economies of scale and an improved demand profile. Unfortunately, 
it is not clear what proportion of the observed price decrease is related to a 
flatter demand profile, and therefore lower bulk-purchase price. Penn (1992: 
5), on the other hand, maintains that no fundamental economies of scale exist 
in the distribution of electricity, but that those support services that do exhibit 
economies of scale can be provided by joint programmes between distributors. 
Clearly there are many areas of the distribution business, such as human 
resources management, training, financial management, planning 
(standardisation etc), marke ing, bulk-purchasing, spares holdings and 
network control that will demonstrate economies of scale. The logical 
approach will be to have large distributors that will allow the decentralisation 
of those functions which show no economies of scale and which benefit from 
decentralised specificity, while simultaneously enabling the centralisation of 
those functions that do show economies of scale. 
The need for functional differentiation 
In industrialised and newly-industrialised countries over the last decade, there 
has been a trend towards the organisational separation of generation and 
distribution. This was largely motivated by the difference in the nature of the 
two activities. The distribution sector has developed to become a 
commercially based, service-oriented activity, involving constant interaction 
with consumers who demand satisfactory "customer service". The generation 
sector, on the other hand, has been characterised by escalating capital and fuel 
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costs, and increasing public demand for environmental protection. This has 
led to greater sophistication in the technological base of construction, 
operation and maintenance, demanding a continually specialising work force. 
Developments in the nature of these activiti~s have· thus followed divergent 
paths; their separation has become necessary to ensure that a "focus on the 
core business" could be retained. 
The separation of distribution from generation and transmission will free the 
distribution management from senior . generation and transmission 
management, which dominates in vertically integrated monopolies. It will 
also expose distribution management more effectively to consumer demands. 
Management will thus tend to adopt a more independent approach, and be 
obliged to act in the consumer's interest when negotiating with generation and 
transmission. 
More recently, there has also been a move towards separating transmission. 
The formation of national transmission grids i;equir,es central co-ordination of 
operations (dispatch). Attempts to establish generation competition (at the 
margin, or in the whole industry) and international electricity trade, require 
that the dispatching authority be independent from the generators. In South 
Africa, the most important initial change will be to separate distribution from 
generation and transmission in order to allow distributors to focus on 
customer service, electricity end-use and electrification. The separation of 
transmission itself will become an issue only when South Africa's excess 
generating capacity is exhausted. 
The need to minimise the cost of finance 
The availability of low-cost finance is affected by industry structure as well as 
by the governing regime. Enterprises faced with a large demand for 
electrification would have to borrow heavily to finance an electrification 
programme. With regard to structure, those with a large revenue-generating 
asset base, and a healthy balance sheet, would hold a distinct advantage over 
smaller distributors in minimising the lender's risk, and thus facilitating easier 
access to low-cost finance. 
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The locality and nature of the consumer base , 
. I 
The locality of consumers and their moven:i.ent (for example urbanisation) 
could potentially affect the distribution functi~:m. A change in the number of 
poor domestic consumers as opposed to wealthier domestic, commercial and 
industrial consumers, which will be a result of the electrification process in 
South Africa, could have an effect on the desired ESI structure. If the 
geographical spread of high- and low-consumption consumers within a region 
is very uneven, it would make sense to have larger distributors to enable the 
sustainable delivery of electricity to all consumers, by maintaining realistie 
average revenues and costs. 
3.4 General conclusions and guidelines 
The guidelines that follow, are concluded from the discussion in this chapter, 
and will be the basis for detailed policy proposals in Chapter Four. 
GOVERNANCE: 
Policy: 
The following points on the policy formulation process are concluded from 
section 3.2. l: 
• It is argued in this section that policy formulation and utility 
management will be improved if government and utility managers are 
placed at an arm's-length relationship to each other. This can be 
achieved by institutionally separating policy formulation and utility 
management. 
• It is further argued that, to enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
the policies that emerge from the policy process, stakeholders should be 
directly involved in electricity policy formulation and utility supervision. 
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Ownership and competition: 
The following points broadly relating to questions around appropriate 
ownership of the ESI and competition are concluded from section 3.2.2: 
• It is suggested that improvements in investment and operational 
efficiencies will not necessarily be achieved by ESI privatisation. If will 
be more effective if the ESI is predominantly retained in public 
ownership. However, the incentives for efficiency improvements 
provided to managers, could be restructured and improved. 
• It is also argued in this section that, although the present generation 
overcapacity makes competition in electricity bulk supply impossible, it 
would improve Eskom's management efficiency and retain downward 
pressure on Eskom tariffs, if its large consumers have other bulk supply 
options. 
• lt is further suggested that a privatised ESI will be reluctant to extend 
access to low income areas and that electrification objectives will be 
easier achieved through a publicly owned enterprise with a clear policy 
mandate. 
• A further guideline derived from the analysis in section 3.2.2 is that a 
large public sector utility, operating at arm's-length from government, 
in a stable policy environment that ensures long-term financial viability, 
will be in the best position to gain access to low-cost finance. 
• It is finally argued in this section that an. arm's-length relationship 
between management and government, and the appropriate incentives 
to improve efficiency for management, can be achieved by establishing 
public utilities as commercialised public corporations. 
RESTRUCTURING THE SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
Chapter Three: Governance and Structure 54 
Regulation and supervision: 
The following points relating to industry regulation and utility supervision are 
concluded from section 3.2.3: 
• It is suggested that, together with the commercialisation of utilities, 
performance contracting will assist in achieving arm's-length governance 
and improved management incentives, by providing for the supervision 
of utilities through incentive-based contract plans. 
• It is also argued in this section that, to promote the coordinated 
development of the ESI, there should be a national regulatory body with 
powers over the entire ESL 
• A final guideline is that the regulator should, in the context of public 
sector utilities governed by performance contracting, act pro-actively to 
inform, mediate and audit the governing processes on the basis of its 
technical expertise. 
STRUCTURE: 
The following guidelines are concluded from the discussion in section 3.3.1: 
• Changes in South Africa's national social and economic policy objectives 
towards a greater concern with the equitable provision of social services 
requires the restructuring of the ESI. 
• Generation and transmission investment planning, and system 
operations, should be coordinated centrally to exploit economies of 
scope. 
• Distribution should be functionally separated from generation and 
transmission to allow distributors to focus on their core business of 
customer service and electrification. 
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• Distribution should be consolidated into a small number of large entities 
to allow for the centralisation of functions that show economies of scale 
and the decentralisation of functions that benefit from decentralised 
specificity. 
RESTRUCTURING THE SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter Four 
POLICY PROPQSALS 
' r· 
I 
A future government will give high priority to the provision of social 
I 
infrastructure such as housing, water, sewera~e, roads and electricity. In th~ 
case of electricity, as with many other services, it has become clear that the 
delivery system is tightly bound up with the fragmented local government 
inherited from apartheid. Accelerated shod-term delivery will thus depend 
on the extent to which present systems can be adapted and redirected, while 
medium-term policy must attempt to fundamentally restructure delivery 
systems. Policy making will increasingly have to differentiate between 
short-term management of the transition, and medium-term restructuring 
goals. 
Medium-term goals are here defined as goals which reflect the proposed 
structure for the industry as it should exist in three years' time. Medium-term 
and short-term transitional issues are closely related. Decisions about 
medium-term policy goals give overall direction to short-term policy, while 
short-term solutions set precedents that could affect, and even foreclose, 
medium-term options. 
Medium-term policy options that fall within the policy guidelines determined 
in the previous chapter are evaluated in this chapter, and the final governance 
proposals are discussed in some detail. Options for the structure of the 
industry are only discussed and evaluated briefly as the main emphasis of this 
thesis is placed on issues related to the governance of the ESL The short-term 
management of the transition is discussed in the final chapter. 
Medium-term proposals are partly based on assumptions about the 
development of economic, social and political factors external to the ESL 
Because-the accuracy of such assumptions is necessarily limited, medium-term 
policy proposals constitute development goals rather than an attempt to 
prescribe the precise condition of the industry over three years. As time goes 
by, knowledge about the future economic, social and political environment 
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will improve, and should result in an ongoing review of longer-term, 
development policies. 
4.2 Structure proposals 
In accordance with the guiding principles determined in the previous chapter, 
it is proposed that the functions of generation, transmission and distribution 
should be separated. Given the challenges of a major national electrification 
programme over the next twenty years, it is proposed that distribution should . 
be institutionally separated from generation and transmission. 
4.2.1 Distribution 
Two central questions have to be answered about the structuring of the 
distribution sector: how will the distributor borders be determined (in the case 
of more than one distributor); and who will be responsible for specialised 
distribution functions, such as rural electrification (RE), or the electricity needs 
of very large consumers requiring special distribution capabilities. 
Distributor borders 
The following determinants of the ESI structure identified in the previous 
chapter should have a direc  bearing on the determination of distributor 
borders: 
• The powers and functions (including electricity) delegated to 
sub-national government. 
• The need to capture economies of scale and scope. 
• The location of present and future consumers. 
The powers and functions of sub-national government as determined by 
Chapter 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Bill (B 212-
93 (GA)) and the Local Government Transition Bill (B 214-93 (GA)), provide 
for concurrent powers over the supply of electricity. Local government 
powers are subject to national legislation. It is thus legally possible to 
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establish distributors that span more than one local government and even 
more than one province if appropriate national legislation is in place. 
A similar rationalisation will be required to capture economies of scale and 
. ' 
scope as discussed in Chapter Three. Distributors should also be large enough 
to cover a healthy balance of urban and rural, and domestic and 
commercial/industrial customers, and be able to accommodate any rapid 
changes in the composition of its customer base. 
The above determinants thus all favour rationalisation of the currently 
fragmented distribution industry by establishing a few, large distributors. A 
figure of less than ten has been suggested by the National Electrification 
Forum. The different options for establishing rationalised distributors are 
identified as follows: 
a) Future provinces could be adopted as the boundaries for distributors. 
b) Distributor borders could be drawn on the basis of technical 
considerations such as the location of consumers and bulk supply points, 
and the financial viability of the new entities. These functional regions 
would probably not coincide with constitutional provinces. The 
Association of Municipal Electricity Undertakings has put forward a 
proposal for six functional regions (AMEU 1993). The supply side 
database compiled by the National Electrification Forum could be used 
to model the proposed distributor models in terms of the potential 
consumer base, human resource requirements, financial flows and the 
asset base. 
c) All distributors could be amalgamated into a single national 
undertaking. 
In all of the above options, distributors will have internal divisions for 
decentralising geographically-bound management functions, but they will also 
be able to benefit from the economies of scale that can exist in the distribution 
of electricity. 
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i 
Establishing electricity distributors along future provincial borders would 
implicitly situate the distributors within . the political tension betweel} 
provincial and national government. Bot!) tiers :of government could b«7 
tempted to obtain an unhealthy level of dire,ct control over distributors in an 
attempt to gain an upper hand in the national versus provincial power 
struggle. Such structuring would constrain the effectiveness of the governance 
system outlined below. 
A possible advantage of this model is that ·provincial distributors will be 
bound to develop good working relationships with provincial governments 
and as provincial governments establish their development programmes, 
distributors would thus be able to align their objectives and coordinate theit 
electrification projects with other provincial development activities. 
Preliminary modelling by the NELF Supply Side Database (NELF 1993) 
indicates that most distributors modeled along provincial borders will not be 
able to finance both the capital and recurrent costs that would be associated 
with the electrification programme required in those areas. This model will 
thus not be viable in the absence of an effective electrification financing 
mechanism that is able to cover capital expenditure and recurring financial 
shortfalls associated with rural electrification (possibly by cross-subsiding from 
more viable distributors, such as the PWV). 
If distributors are modeled on the basis of technical considerations as 
proposed in (b ), financial viability will inevitably be the predominating 
determinant. The AMEU proposal and preliminary modelling by NELF 
suggest that between four and six distributors will be established if this logic 
is followed. Distributors will now not naturally seem to fall within the 
political jurisdiction of provinces and this model would thus sit more 
comfortably with the suggested system of governance proposed below. It 
would have the disadvantage that one distributor would now have to 
coordinate its activities with more than one province and comply with the 
(possibly differing) policies and reporting demands of more than one 
provincial government. 
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Distributors in this model will by design be in a financially strong position 
and less reliant on inter-distributor transfe~s or large-scale fiscal support~ 
They will thus be equipped to implement their part of a national electrification 
programme. 
A single national distributor (c) would be least vulnerable to conflict between 
provincial and national governments. It woJld also be free to organise and 
re-organise its internal structure to achieve particular objectives (presently it 
would be national electrification) in changing circumstances. Raising finance 
for electrification, and the cross-subsidisation of recurrent short-falls, would 
be easily achieved. Under these circumstances the danger would exist that the 
real level of cross-subsidisation of projects would be hidden and not easily 
controlled. 
Unless a concerted effort is made to decentralise authority and expose district 
managers to local development needs, a national utility runs the risk of 
becoming an inaccessible monolith that delivers a service that is not 
coordinated with, and inappropriate for local needs. 
It seems that, depending on political and constitutional developments, all three 
models could be made to work, but that (b) 'and (c) would probably be more 
successful in implementing a large electrification programme. The analysis of 
structural (as apposed to governance) issues, is not the primary objective of 
this thesis, and policy options for distributer borders are not developed and 
evaluated in any greater detail. 
Rural electrification 
The larger resource requirements of rural electrification (RE), its net financial 
drain on supply authorities (Van Horen 1994), and the important role it could 
play in rural development, all require careful consideration when the 
responsibility for RE is assigned. Foley (1992: 283) points out that rural 
electrification is often in conflict with the primary concerns of utilities 
mandated to implement it. This conflict relates to the low returns derived 
from rural electrification, and the temptation to divert resources to other, more 
financially rewarding activities. Foley also points to the low prestige afforded 
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rural electrification by the implementing organisations, and the resulting 
difficulty in attracting the attention of competent staff. He suggests that the 
problem could be solved by creating a separate n.~ral electrification agency, 
either in the form of an internal division, or (l~an organisation external to the 
existing utility. 
In addition, three important issues have to be considered. 
a) It must be ensured that the required resources for electrification, system 
operation and network maintenance are available to the distributor 
involved, and that the rural lobby has adequate leverage when resources 
. . 
(largely finance) are allocated. 
The issues of lobbying for resources and distributor accountability are 
often raised in the context of the structure of delivery organisations, but · 
they are, strictly speaking, related to the governance of the industry. In 
terms of governance, it would be rational to separate the formulation of 
rural electrification policy (and thus decisions about the allocation of 
resources), from the day-to-day management of the distributor. The 
issue of lobbying for rural res urces could be addressed most effectively 
at the level where national energy and electricity policy are determined; 
in other words, at the level of national government itself (specifically in 
the Energy Policy Council, discussed under the medium term 
governance proposals below). Here it would be possible for the rural 
lobbies to combine resources and act in unison when demanding rural 
service delivery. 
b) Rural electricity will have to be delivered efficiently with the minimum 
of overhead costs to enable the service to be extended as far as possible. 
It would be counterproductive to have a duplication of infrastructure in 
one geographical area. Separate rural distributors would have severe 
resource constraints, even with potential national subsidisation, while 
distributors that service metropolitan areas only could potentially 
generate large surpluses. The problem could be solved by having larger 
distributors servicing a combination of urban and rural areas. 
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c) Distributors responsible for rural service will have to closely co-ordinate 
electricity supply with other development activities and community 
requirements, in order to ensure that the benefits of electrification ar~ 
maximised. Community participation in electrification planning, and 
contribution to the costs of electricity supply, could be enabled by the 
establishment of co-operatives that conttibute ;to construction, electricit}r 
vending, maintenance and fault reporting. 
The rural lobby should thus be given representation at the level where 
national electricity policy is formulated and guidelines about public resource 
allocation (such as grant funding for rural electrification) are determined. 
Rural electrification will be most effectively undertaken by large regional 
distributors or a national distributor with an internal division responsible for 
' 
rural electrification. Resource allocation should be both formalised and 
transparent, and the rural electrification division should have access to 
external grant funding. Clear objectives should be set against which 
performance can be appraised. The rural electrification division should 
develop specialised methodologies for rural electricity supply that should 
involve supporting community participation and ground-level institutional 
development. 
The national electrification fund 
A national electrification fund could be established to facilitate electrification 
during the transition of the ESI and thereafter (Van Horen 1994). It could 
have two main functions: 
a) to raise loan and grant finance for electrification; and 
b) to allocate this finance equitably between households over time. 
Initially this fund could be financed by a fiscal grant, which should be used 
as seed finance to raise further loan and grant funds. Foreign donors could 
also contribute to the initial seed finance. In theory this could also receive 
support in the form of a levy on electricity sales. However, such a levy could 
only be imposed after wide negotiation. When future grant funds for 
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electrification become available, the benefits could be spread equitably by 
channelling them through the electrification. fund, where they could be used 
as collateral to raise further finance. 
The fund may fall under the control of the Energy ·Policy Council (proposed 
below), but its administration could be corifracted out to the Development 
Bank of Southern Africa, or Eskom. Funds should be allocated on the basis 
of priority rules determined by the Energy Policy Council. 
4.2.2 Generation and Transmission 
Although generation and transmission lie outside the main focus of this 
research, some broad pointers to areas that require further investigation are 
appropriate. 
In terms of Section 16 of the Electricity Act (No. 41 of 1987), Eskom has 
effective control over the acquisition of any new generation plant in South 
Africa and does not, in practice, allow other parties to acquire large generation 
capacity. However, the possibility of providing grid access to independent 
generators and co-generators in the future, should be investigated. Although 
the economic rationality of these options might sound questionable given 
Eskom's current surplus generating capacity, there are important reasons why 
they deserve further investigation: 
• The real cost of transmitting power to regions that are far from the 
Eskom generation centre of gravity in the Eastern Transvaal, is higher 
than Eskom's current two to three per cent transmission surcharge. 
Rough estimates indicate that the line losses from the Transvaal to the 
Western Cape alone run to more than 3 per cent. The capital, 
maintenance and operating costs of the long-distance transmission 
networks have to be added to the line losses to calculate the real 
transmission differential. If the real transmission cost of electricity is 
taken into account, electricity generated closer to the source of 
consumption, in areas far from the Eastern Transvaal, could be 
competitive, despite the potentially higher generation costs . 
.. 
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• National demand growth has a very close correlation to GDP growth; if 
·, ' . ' 
South Africa's economy begins to expand again, electricity demand will 
. ' 
grow in kind, and new generating capacity will be needed. 
• The thousands of poor households that will be connected to the national 
: : ·• . 1 
grid over the next fifteen years as p~rt of the accelerated nationa~ 
electrification programme, will signifi~antly increase national pea~ 
demand. Recent experience suggests that this demand is very "peaky" in 
nature and that load factors are typically in the order of 35% (Surtees et 
al 1994). Although the problem could be addressed by demand side 
management measures up to a certain extent, household electrification 
will rapidly absorb the spare generating capacity on the national grid. 
In 1993 Eskom had a total power station net maximum capacity of 
37 636 MW and a peak demand of 23 169 MW (Eskom 1994). This 
means that, depending on the reserve margin that is required, Eskom 
had a surplus capacity of between 9000 and 10 000 MW in 1993. 
• Increased co-generation could increase energy efficiency and energy 
conservation. 
• Plans to build an interconnected Southern African grid will be slow in 
implementation, and will not meet the growth in South Africa's 
electricity demand by the tum of the century. 
• The threat of municipal competition has possibly played a role in 
stimulating Eskom's generating efficiency in the past (Horwitz 1993). 
Limited marginal competition could constitute an effective incentive for 
efficiency improvements in future. 
• The involvement of foreign capital in the construction of new power 
stations could constitute an important additional source of capital for 
South Africa. 
If alternative generation sources, as discussed above, become desirable from 
a national energy policy perspective, transmission could be separated from 
generation to ensure impartial grid access and dispatch. Eskom's current 
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divisional separation between Generation and. Tran~mission should thus also 
be maintained. 
The final decision on the ownership and ~?ntinued operation of the few 
municipal coal-fired power stations (about four per cent of national capacity) 
should be based on economic considerations. Assuming that future 
distributors retain these power stations, it is proposed that they be charged the 
same cost-reflective bulk tariffs (for example, time-of-use) as others, and that 
they should not be given any financial incentives not to use these power 
stations, as is currently the case with the special Eskom discourits1• As long 
as Eskom acts as the supplier of last resort, and has to ensure that it can 
supply any demand, distributors should pay Eskom an availability charge for 
an amount equivalent to the capacity of their power stations should they wish 
Eskom to act as a backup supplier. If Eskom similarly requires the availability 
of distributors' power stations for security of supply reasons, distributors 
should either receive capacity discounts from Eskom, or they should be 
remunerated for the service. 
Faced with cost-reflective tariffs, distributors would make rational decisions 
about the continued operation of old municipal power stations. In the long-
term, most would probably be closed down. 
4.3 Governance proposals 
4.3.1 Ownership 
Chapter Three concluded that electricity must be supplied as a public service 
by public corporations that are at arm's-length from government. Although 
there are many ways of institutionalising public corporations, the Eskom 
model of a statutory public corporation with no share-holding has set a 
precedent for establishing arm's-le?gth governance of public utilities in South 
Africa. Electricity distributors could be established in the same way, by means 
of a new electricity act that specifies the rights and obligations of distributors 
1As part of their attempts to utilise their spare generation capacity, Eskom is giving 
municipal electricity undertakings large financial incentives not to run their own power 
stations. 
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and defines the relationship between bulk suppliers (generators), distributors, 
consumers, the regulator and government. 
4.3.2 Options for the governance framework 
In Chapter Three, a broad framework oft guidelines was created, which 
outlined the respective roles of government, stakeholders, the regulator and 
utilities in the governance process, on the basis of separating policy 
formulation from utility management. In fhis section, two models for the 
governance framework are developed which fall within the gove~ance 
guidelines. These models were also chosen to resemble a likely outcome of 
the ESI restructuring negotiations as they are played out between the National 
Electrification Forum, local government representatives and national 
government. A third preferred governance model is developed and evaluated 
in the following section. 
The discussion of the financing options available for a national electrification 
programme, in Chapter Two, concludes that cross-subsidies from the existing 
national consumer base would probably be an important part of the financing 
strategy. Together with the governance guidelines, the viability of cross-
subsidies thus also need to be taken into account when evaluating the 
following models. 
There is little controversy over the policy role of government and stakeholders 
on a national level. A proposal for a national stakeholder Energy Policy 
Council is developed in the next section, and is an essential component of the 
governance equation in the models discussed below. The need to provide a 
role for a national regulator and stakeholders in utility supervision, as pointed 
out in Chapter Three, is also acknowledged in the development of these 
models. 
Provincial Electricity Councils 
It is feasible that, for political reasons, electricity could end up becoming a 
provincial function after the current restructuring of the South African state. 
This would be the result of strong regional political interests, and it can be 
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·~ l. 
. . 
expected that provincial government will demand to play in important role irl 
the governance of the ESL From the pomt of view of the ESI and its 
consumers on a national basis, this would~b'e an: undesirable situation, as 
argued earlier in this chapter. A nationai governance model could be 
developed to deal with this situation, as indicated in figure 4.1. 
Minister of Mineral 
and Energy affairs 
- POLICY ENERGY POLICY POLICY LEVEL SUPPORT 
COUNCIL 
-National Stakeholders 
I DMEA I R 
E 
G Electricity Council Electricity Council u 
L Regional government & Regional government & stakeholders stakeholders 
A 
-@ ~ T SUPERVISION 0 - LEVEL - Plan Plan R 
Board of Directors Board of Directors 
DISTRIBUTOR/$ GENERATION & 
TRANSMISSION 
-
Figure 4.1 : The governance framework for provincial distributors 
According to this model, policy for the ESI is formulated by national 
government and a national Energy Policy Council. Policy guidelines are 
promulgated by the minister of Mineral and Energy affairs. Provincial 
distributors are supervised by a provincial Electricity Council, which 
incorporates representatives from both local and provincial government and 
stakeholder groups. The supervisory relationship is formalised through the 
establishment of a contract plan that enables an arm's length relationship to 
be maintained between the distributor and its Electricity Council. The contract 
plan is also a public document which will promote transparent utility 
governance. The national electricity regulator ensures the implementation of 
national policy guidelines in the provincial contract plans through the power 
it has to invalidate a contract plan if the latter is in conflict with national 
policy. 
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A governance model of this kind has the advantage of providing stakeholders 
at a provincial level with significant influence over the industry operating in 
their province. However, this high level of provincial control is also 
potentially the cause of most of the problems related to this model. There are 
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Figure 4.2: Projected financial capacity of distributors to connect households. 
Source: (NELF 1994) 
to be nine provinces in post-election South Africa, and preliminary studies 
indicate that if distributors are arranged along these borders, they would 
differ dramatically in size, and most of them would battle to implement the 
electrification programmes that would be required of them. The projected 
annual electrification cost in every province (the connection rate is as 
suggested by NEES (1993), Scenario 2) and the projected available income for 
electrification is shown in figure 4.2. It is clear that most provinces would not 
be able to achieve the desired rate of electrification (as discussed in Chapter 
Two) and that large financial transfers between distributors would be 
required, which could place a significant burden on the national regulator if 
it was expected to supervise these transfers. This problem could be partly 
resolved by discarding the idea of financial transfers between utilities, and 
rather implementing a national levy, in favour of the proposed national 
electrification fund, on bulk electricity sold to distributors. 
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A further problem with this model is that national union and civiC 
organisations might experience difficulty in finding skilled representatives for 
all nine provincial electricity councils. In the absence of strong household 
consumer and labour representation, the electricity councils would be 
dominated by large commercial consumers arid provincial and local 
government. 
Regional Electricity Councils 
The electricity distribution industry can be rationalised, along functional lines, 
into four to five large distribution utilities with their own stakeholder 
electricity councils. A governance framework similar to that of the provincial 
model above can be implemented. This model would experience the same 
problems discussed above, but to a lesser extent. However, the contract 
planning process between the utility and the electricity council would now be 
complicated by the involvement of at least two provincial governments, and 
a wide range of stakeholders. The provincial governments would represent 
different constituencies, who could possibly have conflicting interests. It 
would be difficult for the electricity council to present the utility with a 
coherent set of proposals for a contract plan. 
4.3.3 National Energy Policy Council 
The preferred model for industry governance is presented in the remaining 
part of this chapter. This model is developed both for a single national 
distributor, or a few (about five) large regional distributors. A broad outline 
of the proposal is provided in Figure 4.3, and is then briefly described. The 
institutional roles and the governance processes are discussed in more detail 
in the sections that follow. 
According to the proposal depicted in Figure 4.3, governance takes place at 
two levels, namely, energy policy formulation, and utility supervision. 
National government appoints a stakeholder Energy Policy Council (EPC) in 
terms of an energy act. The council advises the minister on energy policy, and 
is responsible for macro-planning to support policy formulation. It reflects 
these objectives by being structured on two levels. The policy level includes 
representatives from the departments of Finance, Mineral and Energy Affairs 
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I Minister of Mineral and Energy affairs 
,----- POLICY POLICY 
LEVEL ENERGY POLICY SUPPO!JT 
- COUNCIL 
National Stakeholders 
R 
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G I Department of Min era I and Energy Affairs I 
u 
L I Electricity Division I A 
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-
Figure 4.3: The proposed electricity governance framework 
(DMEA), Development, and others if necessary. It also includes provincial 
government as well as representatives of key consumer groups and labour. 
The general planning level is staffed with professionals who are responsible 
for all the planning and research activities required to support the 
development and implementation of policy. The EPC will constitute the core 
of the national energy policy formulation process, and will give a high profile 
' 
to central stakeholders in the energy economy. All governmental energy 
policy processes should also be obliged to involve the EPC. 
The central policy implementation relationship (utility supervision) is 
embodied in a negotiated contract-plan (CP) agreement between the DMEA, 
as the administrative representative of government, and the utility board of 
(mostly executive) directors. The agreement includes a broad range of 
negotiated performance targets in terms of service and financial parameters. 
Contract plans are three to five year agreements, but are reviewed annually. 
The chief executive director is appointed in terms of the agreement. Other 
executives are appointed by the chief executive, and their appointment is 
confirmed by the DMEA. Service conditions and re-appointment are based on 
performance in terms of the CP agreement. 
A national electricity regulator is the custodian of the CP process, and is 
empowered to act as a referee to ensure unprejudiced CP negotiations. 
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4.3.4 The institutional roles 
This section explains the role of the different players in more detail. 
National government and the Energy Policy Council 
National government plays a central role in the governance process. The 
minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs appoints th~ Energy Policy Council to 
enable stakeholder participation in the policy formulation process. The 
stakeholder representation is detailed in an Energy Act, and the minister 
appoints the representatives from short lists presented by the stakeholder 
bodies. The EPC is thus a body that will emerge from the National 
Electrification Forum (NELF) and the Eskom Electricity Council. It will take 
over the policy functions of the Eskom Electricity Council and local 
government councils (with regard to present municipal distributors). 
Energy and electricity policy is formulated through an interactive process 
between the respective government representatives and other stakeholders in 
the EPC. A methodology of integrated energy planning should be adopted, 
which takes long-term views of all the energy-service needs of consumers, and 
all the primary energy sources available to the economy. The EPC should 
take technical advice from the regulator and utilities. Electricity policy 
determined at this level should be aimed at providing investment-planning, 
financing, tariff structure and tariff level guidelines that will form the basis of 
the utility contract plans. 
The minister implements fundamental aspects of electricity policy by 
promulgating regulations that will be binding on utility conduct in terms of 
a new Electricity Act. 
The role of the DMEA is essentially to administer the implementation of 
relevant legislation and public policy. The utility contract plans should thus 
be negotiated by the DMEA in terms of the electricity policy developed in the 
EPC. An internal Electricity Division represents government and stakeholders 
in the contract planning process. It could draw on the macro-planning 
function in the EPC, and the technical skills and financial knowledge of the 
regulator to inform it during the CP negotiations and reviews (to be discussed 
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below). ' The DMEA Electricity Division thus takes over the supervisory 
function of the Eskom Council and local government councils. 
Provincial government 
Provincial governments will play a central role in ensuring service delivery in 
their areas of jurisdiction. In the case of electricity, the need for provincial 
control is co-ordinated with the need for national control by situating 
provincial government representatives in key positions in the national 
governing process. Provincial representatives are thus included as key 
stakeholders in the Energy Policy Council. They could also be included in the 
Electricity Division of the DMEA when it negotiates with the distributor 
supplying its province. At least one provincial representative should be 
included in the negotiations with the national generation and transmission 
utility (currently Eskom). Provincial government should not have direct 
legislative control over electricity supply. 
Local government 
At present, local government's interest in retaining electricity is based not so 
much on ensuring the delivery of an essential infrastructural service, as on the 
independent revenue base that electricity often provides. Access to large 
electricity surpluses reduces local government's dependence on national or 
provincial fiscal transfers, and effectively gives them greater autonomy. 
The corporatisation of electricity distribution implies that electricity supply 
should be removed from local government control, leaving those that were 
dependent on electricity surpluses with a reduced revenue base. The current 
restructuring of local government should be accompanied by a restructuring 
of the state fiscal transfers in order to ensure an adequate local government 
revenue base. Broad agreement on the restructuring of local government 
finances will be crucial to the corporatisation of electricity distribution. 
Utilities 
The daily affairs of the utility are to be conducted by a board of executive 
directors. The chief executive can choose to appoint non-executive directors, 
such as experienced industrialists, financiers or key stakeholders, to advise the 
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board (Dingley 1993). Director remuneration and 'reapp~intment are linked 
to the utility performance measured in terms of the contract plan. The board 
negotiates the contract plan, and reports on the utility's performance in terms 
of the performance indicators agreed to in the performance contract. They 
also play an important role in: 
• investment planning; 
• the determination of tariff levels; 
• developing supply options; and 
• determining appropriate service levels. 
The regulator 
The regulator acts as an alternative centre of technical and financial expertise 
to that provided by the utilities. It provides a source of independent expert 
information - a function that is not present in government (including the 
Energy Policy Council), or anywhere outside of the utilities. On the basis of 
its expertise, it will: 
• facilitate and mediate the contract planning process; 
• review and comment on DMEA and utility submissions to the CP 
process; 
• audit utility submissions during CP negotiations and reviews; 
• approve decisions on reserved contingent issues in between CP review 
periods (discussed below); 
• act as an ombudsman in the case of a deadlock in CP negotiations or in 
utility-consumer negotiations; and 
• support the EPC in integrated energy planning and policy formulation. 
As part of its review function during the CP negotiations, and its role as 
consultant to the EPC, it will also have a specific brief to: 
• partake in investment planning; 
• partake in tariff design; 
• translate government/EPC electricity policy into a contract plan 
framework; and 
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• determine formulae, on the basis of EPC guidelines, for surplus transfers 
(if necessary). 
The regulator is established in terms of a statute, possibly a revised Electricity 
Act, and is independent from government. To ensure its operational 
' independence, it is funded by a small levy on electricity sales, approved by 
parliament. Its budget adheres to a framework of rules as set out in the Act, 
and its books are audited annually by the auditor general. The regulator is 
managed by a board of professionals, who are appointed by parliament from 
a list prepared by the EPC. They are to be appointed on the basis of their 
expert knowledge of the ESL The regulator will have to be supported by full-
time professional employees to enable it to fulfil its duties. 
4.3.5 The contract plan 
The contract plan (CP) forms the heart of the utility governance process. The 
contract plan records a negotiated agreement between the DMEA and the 
utility board of directors. It specifies the rights and obligations of both parties 
(government/EPC and the utility board of directors) over a period of up _to 
five years. The agreement contains the central components of a five-year 
business plan for the utility, by specifying a set of strategic plans and 
performance indicators. It defines how the performance indicators will be 
measured, and sets performance targets in terms of the indicators. 
Performance indicators should reflect a comprehensive set of technological, 
environmental, social, macro-economic and micro-economic goals, as stated in 
the national energy policy statements. Annual performance targets are not set 
on an ad hoc basis; they are part of a longer term business plan. 
The board is provided with incentives linked to the performance targets 
specified in the agreement. The CP identifies circumstances (such as dramatic 
changes in inflation or the GDP growth rate) under which a party would be 
allowed to request a re-negotiation of five-year performance targets. 
4.3.6 The negotiating process 
The drafting of the contract plan is an iterative process. In broad outline it 
could develop as follows: the regulator presents the DMEA with a standard 
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contract plan skeleton that contains the essential elements for a successful CP, 
and which reflects national energy policy and electricity regulations. The 
DMEA Electricity Division develops the framework to reflect their 
requirements within the manoeuvring space availaqle, and they then present 
this to the utility. The utility proceeds to develop a five-year business plan 
aimed at meeting the criteria of the proposed CP. On the basis of the business 
plan, the utility alters the CP and presents it to the regulator for review, before 
presentation to the DMEA. The detail of the CP is then negotiated to the 
point where both the parties (DMEA and utility) agree on realistic outputs 
within the resource constraints. During the CP negotiating process, the 
regulator should provide an independent review of the implications of the 
respective proposals. 
The negotiated planning process is illustrated by the example of generation 
and transmission capacity planning. In this case, capacity planning is the 
responsibility of the dispatch authority (the utility responsible for transmission 
control), the regulator and the EPC. The EPC determines the broad policy 
outlines and presents them to the DMEA. The dispatch authority undertakes 
the long-term planning, and capacity plans are submitted to the regulator, 
who provides an independent review of the proposals, and is empowered to 
return the plans to the utility for further investigation if it is not satisfied. 
Resubmitted proposals have to be passed on to the DMEA, but the regulator 
is entitled to comment in an independent report attached to the proposal. The 
final agreement is made between the utility and the DMEA. 
Electrification planning is in the first instance undertaken by the distributors 
who participate in local electricity planning committees. These committees are 
set up to provide local government and local stakeholders with an mechanism 
for influencing utility activities in their area. Distribu~ors also co-operate with 
the national electrification planning database, situated in the EPC, that enables 
global electrification targets to be set. Global targets are in turn also used by 
the utilities to develop detailed business plans, which are translated into 
performance indicators as part of the respective contract plans. During 
contract planning, the details of the electrification plans are negotiated in the 
same way as generation and transmission investment planning. 
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Once a CP is agreed on the utility is left to manage its affairs for the rest of 
the year. The question arises as to how, during the year, the utility should 
deal with contingent issues that would normally form a significant part of 
contract plan negotiations, but which require quick decisions. The regulator 
can be empowered in terms of the electricity act t9 have a veto power over 
any such reserved decisions. The CP should also specify what issues ar~ 
reserved for regulator approval. These issues should only include decisions 
that can have a long-term affect on utility performance and the cost of 
electricity. Reserved issues should never transgress the principle of arm's:. 
length governance, and the regulator should be empowered to disqualify any 
stipulations that it deems to be in conflict with arm's-length governance. 
The contract plan is reviewed annually. The annual review process comprises 
three steps: 
a) utility performance is reviewed; 
b) the planning horizon is extended for another year, based on the past 
year's performance and developments in the external economic and 
social environment; and 
c) the contract plan is subsequently adjusted on the basis of the review 
process, where necessary. 
Submissions presented by the utility during the annual review process are to 
be scrutinised and commented on by the regulator before they can be tabled 
at the review meeting between the DMEA and the utility board. The regulator 
has the right to audit these submissions before it confirms their factual 
accuracy. A backstop mechanism is built in to deal with a possible deadlock 
during the CP negotiation and review process. The electricity act specifies the 
conditions under which a matter would be referred to the regulator for 
arbitration. Recourse to the courts is possible~ on procedural grounds. 
The regulator is generally not empowered to dictate agreements between 
government and the utilities. But it does have the power to intervene and 
order utility or DMEA submissions to be returned for further development or 
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revisions before allowing them to be presented for negotiations under the 
following circumstances. 
• submissions do not adhere to the national electricity regulations as 
promulgated by the minister; 
• submissions do not adhere to the aims of national energy policy as 
specified by a national energy strategy (to be determined by the EPC); 
• the regulator deems submissions to be contravening specific stipulations 
of the electricity act (for example, when, in the absence of other sources 
of revenue, overall tariff levels do not enable the revenue requirement 
to be met); 
• the regulator finds submissions to be factually incomplete or incorrect 
(especially during performance reviews). 
The governance process is further illustrated by the following points. 
Tariffs 
Tariffs are determined by a two-stage process. Guidelines for tariff structures 
are determined by the Energy Policy Council, as a central part of electricity 
policy. The tariff level, on the other hand, is a central part of the CP 
negotiations, and is determined independently of the tariff structure. 
It would be possible for the EPC to specify a national range for domestic 
tariffs if it wishes to standardise domestic tariffs. The regulator would in this 
case determine the minimum and maximum levels involved. 
Surplus transfers 
Given the uneven geographic distribution of present and future consumers, 
it will probably be necessary to transfer operating surpluses between 
distributors (in the case of multiple distributors). The regulator would then 
have to determine how surpluses should be transferred from one distributor 
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to another. There are many ways of affecting the transfers, but some 
important guidelines would have to be applied. 
• In the context of a governance process based on a contract plan, it is 
important that, by determining the revenue transfers, the regulator does 
not present the utility with a set of incentives which are not part of the 
CP. If revenue transfers are based on indicators that are not included in 
the CP, the utility could be faced with contradictory incentives, which 
might result in inefficient management. The method of determining the 
revenue transfer should thus be based on performance indicators that are 
negotiated as part of the contract plan, such as target sales and operating 
costs. 
• The revenue transfer process will impose strong incentives on 
distributors, and it is necessary to ensure that these will have the desired 
effects. Transfers should always present inc ntives that motivate utilities 
to minimise costs and improve their service in terms of quality and 
access. They should thus not be solely based on cost-plus formulae, but 
rather involve an incentive mechanism similar to price-cap regulation. 
The governance process is summarised in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: The ESI governance process 
Role Player Represents Appointed by Functions When 
Minister of National Democratic Politically responsible for 
Mineral and Government government electricity supply 
Energy Affairs 
Appoints EPC When required 
Determines electricity When required 
policy 
Energy Policy Stakeholders; Minister, as Advises Minister on Continuously 
Council national and specified by Act energy and electricity 
provincial policy 
government 
Department of Government Minister of Mineral Administers legislation 
Mineral and and Energy Affairs 
Energy Affairs Negotiates contract plan Annually 
Appoints chief executive When required 
Board of Utility Chief executive Devel ps 5 year business Annually 
directors plan 
Proposes performance Annually 
indicators and 
target values 
Negotiates CP Annually 
Reports on performance Annually 
Manages utility 
Regulator Public interest Parliament Translate government Annually 
policy into CP framework 
Review and audit: Annually 
• Government and 
utility CP 
proposals 
• Investment plans 
• CP review 
submissions 
Ombudsman When required 
Regulate financial When required 
transfers 
Partake in EPC policy When required 
process where required 
RESTRUCTURING THE SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
Chapter Four: Policy Proposals 80 
4.3.7 Evaluation 
In evaluating the Energy Policy Council governance model the following 
points can be made: 
• An advantage of the proposed model is that it separates political (EPC) 
and technocratic (regulator and management) decision-making, and 
attempts to find an appropriate differential between the two functions. 
• This model also presents the opportunity to successfully implement a 
stakeholder governance model. The establishment of a single national 
Energy Policy Council provides all stakeholders, even representatives 
from rural constituencies, with the opportunity of influencing policy-
making processes. 
, • The inclusion of stakeholders in the EPC, the use of a contract planning 
mechanism and the establishment of an electricity regulator with clearly 
defined powers to intervene in the governance process, will effectively 
place the industry at arm's-length from government. Although 
government will still be responsible for the general policy orientation of 
the industry, it will be protected to a degree from populist demands for 
delivery beyond reasonable bounds, by the mediating influence of 
stakeholders and the regulator. 
• The Energy Policy Council ensures that electricity plam1ing is integrated 
with national energy policy. Electricity supply to households, for 
instance, can be co-ordinated with other supply options. A similar co-
ordination in the supply of energy to the industrial, commercial and 
other sectors will result in optimal energy utilisation. 
• The transition of the ESI (discussed in the following chapter) is a process 
that will take several years to complete. This governance model has the 
advantage that, during the transition period, it can cope with both a 
single national distributor, and a few regional distributors. 
RESTRUCTURING THE SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
Chapter Four: Policy Proposals 81 
• The involvement of a broad range of stakeholders (including 
representatives of provincial government) in the EPC means that a 
deadlock in decision-making can occur and result in similar problems to 
those pointed out in the discussion of the Regional Electricity Council 
model. The possibility of a deadlock and poor decision-making will 
depend to a large degree on the balance of power in the EPC. It is 
suggested that national government should maintain a strong enough 
presence in the EPC to avoid deadlock situations. 
• A disadvantage of the model is that, it is possible that government and 
politically appointed utility directors could conspire to exclude the 
regulator in the governance process, particularly if the EPC becomes 
totally dominated by government (which would fundamentally 
undermine its purpose). The desired arm's-length.relationship between 
the utility and government will thus be undermined. 
• This model, with its relatively sophisticated separation of powers and 
functions, will require careful explanation to political decision-makers, 
and accurate description in law. If the balance of powers is not 
maintained in the enacting laws,_it will be successful. 
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Chapter Five 
Managing the Transition 
A clear policy for restructuring the ESI, as outlined in the previous chapter, 
provides an end goal, but does not in any way help to deal with the practical 
complexities of managing the transformation of the current industry. This 
final chapter analyses questions concerning the management of the transition 
of the ESI, based on the assumption that agreement on an appropriate model 
for the ESI (or at least its desired characteristics), structured along the lines 
proposed in Chapter Four, can be reached. 
5.1 Objectives of transition 
The transition of the ESI will not only have to overcome obstacles to 
restructuring the industry; it will also have to simultaneously realise the 
objective of accelerated electrification in the context of a changing industry. 
Obstacles to short-term electrification will have to be overcome before the 
restructuring of the ESI can be completed. There are thus essentially two 
objectives for the transition of the ESI from the current status quo to the 
desired future dispensation: 
• restructuring in terms of the agreed guidelines; and 
• the simultaneous acceleration of electrification. 
The key conditions for a successful transition of the ESI are outlined below. 
Thereafter, the experience of the National Electrification Forum (NELF) is 
reviewed, and different strategies for managing transition are discussed. 
5.2 Key conditions for the transition 
Most of the obstacles to transition exist as a result of the specific political, 
economic, social, and institutional conditions in South Africa. These obstacles 
point to factors crucial for success, the neglect of which will seriously affect 
the progress in the transition period. This section discusses the key issues 
concerning the transition, with the aim of highlighting the main problems that 
will have to be solved during this process. 
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The powers and functions of sub-national government 
If regional or local government is given exclusive power over electricity in an 
interim or final constitution, the guidelines proposed above will be impossible 
to implement. It is vital to ensure that the powers and functions given to 
regional government do not preclude the possibility of implementing national 
governance functions. As indicated in previous chapters, the newly adopted 
South African constitution provides local, regional and national government 
with concurrent powers over the supply of electricity. The constitution could 
still be amended during the months leading up to the April 1994 election, and 
in the years thereafter, when the final South African constitution will be 
negotiated. 
The trans/ er of local government assets and liabilities 
Answers have to be found to the problems of transferring the electricity assets 
from municipalities, as well as dealing with existing electricity debts which 
have, in many cases, not been serviced for years. In every case, the details of 
take-over will have to be negotiated. Nationally agreed principles guiding the 
take-overs will facilitate the transition process. 
Section 14 of the Electricity Act (No 41 of 1987) states that, in the case of the 
take-over of electricity undertakings, the former undertaker has to be 
compensated for the "fair" value of the assets. It would clearly be impossible 
to compensate all municipalities for the take-over of their assets on the basis 
of, for example, replacement costs. With the corporatisation of electricity 
supply, the municipal distributor assets would be transferred from one public 
undertaking to another. A strong case can thus be made out for the repealing 
of this provision of the electricity act. At the same time, it would be 
unrealistic to leave municipalities with debt associated with income-generating 
assets that have been expropriated from them. In principle, assets should thus 
be transferred to public utilities without compensation, but all existing 
liabilities associated with electricity assets, would have to be transferred with 
the assets. 
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Tlie financial impact on local government 
The electricity surpluses that are generated by the larger white cities as ~ 
result of their sales to commercial and industrial consumers have been an 
important source of revenue for many white municipalities for years. The 
National Electrification Forum supply-side database indicates that the transfe~ 
of electricity surpluses to general rates accounts in municipalities amounts to 
about Rl,3 billion per year. These surpluses have not.yet been compared to 
the operating losses realised by the electricity departments of many poorer 
local governments. The current restructuring in local government (or the 
distributor rationalisation proposed in this thesis) will have the effect that the 
surpluses generated by the electricity departments of the old white 
municipalities, will to a large extent now be absorbed by the shortfalls 
incurred by the electricity department in the old black local authority areas. 
Negotiators involved in local government restructuring are proceeding on the 
basis of optimistic assumptions about the availability and magnitude of these 
surpluses. 
The proposal to establish distributors as "arm's-length" public corporations 
implies that they will be distinct financial entities that are independent from 
local government. The current municipal "structural" financial transfers will 
thus not be sustainable in the proposed future dispensation. This does not 
preclude the possibility of taxing electricity in a transparent manner in order 
to raise public funds, but it does mean that the current dependence of white 
ratepayers on the electricity surpluses raised from sales to industrial and 
commercial consumers will have to be terminated. Future unified local 
governments will be in dire need of revenue, and if electricity surpluses are 
no longer available, alternative revenue sources will have to be found. 
Financial viability in the context of rapid electrification 
The financial viability of the industry has to be maintained during the 
transition process in order to ensure that the industry will be on a stable 
footing, capable of providing electricity in the future under conditions of 
increased economic growth and growing demand. Electrification programmes 
expose utilities to significant financial risk at the best of times. When a large 
electrification program is implemented by a fragmented industry and based 
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on hastily drafted policies, is becomes increasingly difficult to determine and 
manage the increased financial risk. 
The large capital and operating expenditure associated with electrification 
means that utilities are exposed to financial risk in the following ways: 
• Tariff risk 
During the highly politicised transition period, utilities face the risk that 
they could be expected to charge tariffs that do not enable them to meet 
their revenue requirement. 
• Consumption risk 
If electricity consumption is lower than expected, revenues will be lower 
than planned. The cumulative net funding requirement will thus be 
higher, and the financial position of the utility will be weaker. 
• Non-payment risk 
Utilities are always exposed to a revenue recovery (non-payment) risk, 
but when facing large loan servicing requirements, the utility will be 
; 
more vulnerable when revenues are not recovered. The advent of 
' 
pre-payment meters has increased distributor capital expenditure, but 
will minimise the revenue recovery risk in the future. 
• Technological risk 
Technology choices for electrification can affect the financial viability of 
distributors for long periods into future. When distributors standardise 
on unproven technology, they run the risk of widespread future failure, 
which will necessitate either replacement or expensive maintenance 
programmes. 
During the transitional period, electrification will be accelerated to meet a 
highly politicised popular demand for social services. Realistic governance 
(including tariff setting) and careful management will be required to minimise 
financial risk and ensure long-term financial sustainability. 
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Tariffs that are affordable and legitimate 
In addition to the need for realistic tariff levels, other tariff-related problems, 
such as the unaffordability of electricity, controversy concerning the present 
patchwork of tariffs, and continued payment boycotts, pose significan't 
obstacles to electrification. It will be crucial to establish tariffs that are 
affordable and legitimate, if the transition of the ESl and interim electrification 
is to take place successfully. 
Finance for electrification 
During the transition, access to finance for electrification has to be ensured 
(especially for non-Eskom distributors). The NELF could establish the 
proposed National Electrification Fund by lobbying government for a grant 
of about R0,5 to Rl billion by the next budget cycle. It could use a small 
proportion of the income generated from this grant to employ a handful of 
highly skilled professionals to ·manage the fund. The administration of the 
fund could be contracted out to Eskom or the Development Bank of Southern 
Africa, as proposed above. 
Negotiations could be entered into with other funders of electrification, such 
as the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the Independent Development 
Trust, the relevant government departments and Eskom (as a funder), to 
facilitate the pooling of low-cost finance so that the maximum the benefit can 
be derived from it. The fund could also issue bonds with government 
backing. Eskom's recently issued Electrification Participation Note is an 
example of the type of innovative initiatives that could be pursued to obtain 
finance. 
ln the long-term, the fund could be brought directly under the control of the 
DMEA. 
Access and qbligation to supply 
The present system that gives the first "right to supply" to local authority 
distributors in terms of the Electricity Act, prohibits capable distributors access 
to areas that are presently under-serviced and poorly managed. It also 
exempts distributors which have the resources necessary to electrify under-
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serviced areas from the obligation to supply them. '.fhis problem will have to 
be overcome in the short-term if electrification is to,be accelerated during the 
transition of the ESL 
Management capacity 
Managing the transition of the ESI will require the.services of professionally 
skilled and experienced managers with an intimate knowledge of the industry. 
The services of such people must be retained by giving them security of 
employment and appropriate incentives. 
Human resources 
The implications of change for the present distributor personnel in terms of 
conditions of service, pension funds, medical aid, management practices and 
career prospects must be carefully considered. The transfer of personnel and 
changes in employment conditions will have to be negotiated with the 
relevant trade unions. 
Development planning and co-ordination 
At present, electrification is undertaken without sufficient co-ordination with 
other training, employment, micro-enterprise and service-development 
programmes. The success and benefits of electrification will be significantly 
enhanced by co-ordinating development planning. A precedent can be set for 
the role of future Local Planning Committees by ensuring distributor 
participation in regional economic development forums and other regional 
development forums during the transition. 
5.3 Progress with ESI restructuring 
Since its establishment in May 1993, the National Electrification Forum has 
made considerable progress (at the time of writing, February 1994) in 
developing policies for a national electrification programme, and the 
development of a national electricity utility database to be used in planning 
the restructuring of the industry. The NELF has also reached agreement ori 
the need to establish a national electricity regulator and a national 
electrification fund, but has not yet produced either a proposal for 
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restructuring the ESI or a policy framework for tariff setting. It has therefore 
so far failed to address the most urgent issues. 
The reasons for this failure are related to the nature of the NELF. The NELF 
is a consensus forum that consists of a wide range of sta~eholders, including 
government, the African National Congress (ANC), major unions, large ci~ic 
federations, consumer groups, representatives from white local government 
(the United Municipal Executive (UME), the Association of Municipal 
Electricity Undertakings (AMEU)) and Eskom. · It is supposed to make 
decisions on a consensus basis, and no deadlock-breaking mechanism exists. 
The NELF is typical of a wide range of forums that sprung up in South Africa 
during the early nineties as precursors to the first democratic elections in April 
1994. These forums have arisen from the need to establish legitimate decision-
making bodies at a time when the Nationalist government has found it 
increasingly difficult to govern after acknowledging its illegitimacy, and 
agreeing to hold free elections. However, the NELF process is itself flawed for 
the following reasons: 
a) The representation of the AMEU and Eskom is problematic. The AMEU 
supposedly represents the municipal electricity undertakings, but in 
reality they act in the interests of white local government, by whom they 
are appointed and to whom they have to report. The AMEU, and to a 
lesser extent, the Eskom delegations, are also acting in the interests of 
senior management, rather than the industry as a whole. If it was 
explicitly stated that they were representing an employee group, the 
negotiation process would be able to proceed more easily. 
b) There is confusion about the nature of the conflict that has to be resolved 
by the NELF. For some, it is a conceptual debate about the most 
effective way of organising and governing the electricity sector in South 
Africa, and about the role that the state should play therein - in essence, 
a debate about industry effectiveness and efficiency. For others, the ESI 
is seen as a vehicle for transferring resources and redressing social 
inequalities - essentially, a debate about the promotion of social equity. 
Then there is also a group who see the NELF as a site of negotiation 
where they have to ensure their self-preservation. Hopefully, this 
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confusion will be partly alleviated by the time demands are put frankJy 
on the table in the final effort to reach an agreement. 
c) Being a consensus decision-making body, NELF participants need to 
compromise in order to reach decisions. If a participant has no incentive 
. to compromise in order to reach a decision, or has an incentive to stall 
decisions, a consensus-based process will fail. It seems clear that AMEU, 
together with the local government representatives, the UME, have a 
stake in the status quo and will not support the consensus process. 
Unless a deadlock-breaking mechanism is agreed to, the NELF will fail 
to make final proposals on major issues facing the ESL 
d) One of the reasons for the establishment of the NELF was that there 
existed no party with legitimate power to make decisions on ESI 
restructuring. However, the NELF itself continues to suffer from this 
problem. Participants need to have an understanding of the power base 
of others in order to know what importance to attach to their positions. 
Although participants do not represent constituencies of the same size, 
they have an equal say on the Forum. As a result, objections from even 
the smallest constituency can stall the process. 
e) The question of whether electricity supply should be removed from local 
government remains the single biggest point of contention in the NELF. 
Although the AMEU and the UME are represented on the NELF, they 
do not effectively represent the constituency that would be most affected 
by this issue. Another forum, the Local Government Negotiating Forum 
(LGNF), has been the site for negotiations concerning local government 
reform in South Africa. The NELF has thus excluded an important 
group of stakeholders, while attempting to negotiate an issue related to 
the restructuring of local g.overnment. the AMEU and UME 
representatives that are involved in the NELF, are not directly involved 
in the LGNF, and are thus not able to contribute to the process other 
than by stalling it. Further progress in the NELF will depend on the 
degree to which it manages to engage the central stakeholders in local 
government restructuring. The NELF will have to develop a thorough 
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understanding of the concerns and interest of the local government 
lobby in order to facilitate a negotiated agreement. 
f) A final problem with the modus operandi of the NELF, is that it confuses 
the political and technocratic decision-making processes that need to take 
place in order to restructure the ESL It seems highly impractical to 
expect stakeholder politicians to co-operate with relatively neutral 
technical experts in wading through the quagmire of complicated 
considerations involved in developing a model for ESI restructuring. A 
coherent model for the ESI cannot be developed solely on the basis of 
political horse-trading, but needs to be informed by technical expertise. 
To enable an acceptable model for the ESI to be determi ed, political and 
technocratic processes need to be separated and then linked in a way 
that is transparent. A future democratic government should consult 
with other stakeholders to establish a mission statement for the ESI over 
the next ten years. A technical task group should then be appointed to 
develop and evaluate two or three alternative models on the basis of the 
mission statement, and to present them to government for a final 
decision. 
5.4 Strategies for the transition 
Different strategies can be followed to facilitate the transition of the ESI 
towards an end goal. These strategies will have to address the key issues for 
transition, as well as the current problems experienced by the NELF, as 
discussed above. In practice, the transition will be a process of change that 
involves so many stakeholders at different levels that it will be very difficult 
to control its final outcome. Experience with change management will be 
required to limit the potentially large "transaction costs" that the restructuring 
could incur. Political processes at different levels will be required to obtain 
a final decision to make the change, and to maintain the momentum to reach 
the desired objective. Care needs to be taken to motivate both managers and 
the work force, and to provide them with incentives to ensure the success of 
the restructuring. 
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Two possible str~tegies are discussed below. 
Municipal distributors and Eskom / 
One option will be to follow the route of the present local government 
negotiations, which will lead to the formation of rationalised municipalities 
and metropolitan governments. This will bring about the amalgamation of 
bulk service provision, including electricity. The remaining common (RSA) 
and homeland rural areas and villages could be supplied by Eskom, as is 
currently the case in the common areas of South Africa. Municipalities will 
presumably remain responsible for the supervision of performance and the 
setting of tariffs. 
The obvious advantage of this route is that it will happen by default. The 
main disadvantage will be that all control will still be situated at a local level, 
thereby entrenching electricity supply in the hands of the new local 
government. It would thus create difficulties in completing the transition 
process, and in accelerating and sustaining a national electrification 
programme. 
A single distributor 
Another possibility is that a single body could be mandated to co-ordinate 
distributors as an interim step, before the future distribution dispensation is 
. 
established. 
Restructuring will be a slow process, necessitating careful management. It will 
be important to establish effective control, management and information 
mechanisms during the transition period. The most urgent need is thus not 
to structurally combine distributors along the future borders, but rather to 
establish control structures that will facilitate the co-ordination of restructuring 
and electrification. If the activities of distributors can be co-ordinated on a 
national and regional basis, many of the obstacles to restructuring and interim 
electrification would be overcome. 
During the transition, it will be necessary to have policy formulated on a 
national level. Management of the transition process will also have to be co-
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ordinated nationally. The National Electrification Forum (or a body with 
simi]ar broad legitimacy) will be able to determine policy, but will not be able 
to co-ordinate the management of the transition. It will thus be necessary to 
establish a distributor management body on a national level. This body could 
employ some of the most senior managers in the industry to manage the 
transition in terms of the policy agreed to by the NELF. During the transition, 
the beginnings of the new governance system can be created by establishing 
the first contract plan between the NELF and distribution management, and 
by creating a national regulator with powers over the whole industry. 
In practice, a combination of the two strategies can be managed by allowing 
the default municipal restructuring to go ahead while the major political 
decisions are made. A small amendment to the Electricity Act could be made 
to establish the national regulator and require all electricity undertakings to 
operate under a licence issued by the regulator. Once these steps have been 
completed, the transition can proceed on the basis of close co-operation 
between the policy making body- the NELF-the national regulator, and the 
national distribution management. 
5.5 Concluding Summary 
The proposed transition of the ESI will for the first time fundamentally change 
the way in which electricity is distributed in South Africa. It will enable the 
industry to address the challenge of providing all South Africans with 
electricity, while protecting its financial viability in order to maintain a low-
cost electricity supply to support a growing economy. This thesis has focused 
on the institutional issues that will be important for the establishment of a 
new ESI model. Questions concerning the structure, and especially, the 
governance of the ESI, are critical to the success of a restructured industry. 
By drawing on international experience, this thesis develops a framework for 
the governance of a publicly owned ESI in South Africa. 
The particular contribution to knowledge of this thesis lies in its application 
of international experience to the South African situation, and specifically in 
its distinction between the role of politics and expertise in the governance of 
the ESL On the basis of this distinction, it develops governance models that 
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are based on a contract-plan mechanism, but relies on the role of stakeholders 
and an independent regulator. In this way, it attempts to find an appropriate 
balance between the equity concerns of a new democratic government, and the 
efficiency needs of a developing economy. 
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